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iAbstract
The three takings decisions that the Supreme Court issued at the end of its October 2004 
Term marked a stunning reversal of the Court’s efforts the past three decades to use the Takings 
Clause to define a set of constitutional property rights.  The regulatory takings doctrine, which 
once loomed as a significant threat to the modern regulatory state, now appears after Lingle v. 
Chevron to be a relatively tame, if complicated, check on exceptional instances of regulatory 
abuse.  At the same time, the Public Use Clause, formerly an inconsequential limitation on the 
state’s eminent domain authority, now appears ripe for revision and tightening after a stirring 
four-justice dissent in Kelo v. City of New London and an enormous public protest decrying the 
majority decision.
Notwithstanding this reversal, the 2005 decisions offer a coherent approach to Takings 
Clause enforcement—albeit one that is likely to frustrate commentators, theorists, and property 
rights advocates.  More clearly than ever before, the Court in its 2005 decisions abandoned the 
difficult, if not impossible, task of providing a clear normative justification for the Takings 
Clause.  Instead, its decisions reveal a marked preference for preserving and furthering its vision 
of an institutional system of governance—a jurisprudence that is focused on the question of who
should decide rather than on the substantive issue of what should be decided, and that is 
committed to the passive virtue of deference.  In short, the Rehnquist Court explicitly chose to 
adopt a “legal process” approach to takings.  Because it privileges structure and process over 
explicit considerations of substantive legal and normative issues, this approach is unsatisfactory 
to property and constitutional theorists; because it defers to government decisions, it is 
maddening to property rights advocates; and because it is technocratic and abstract, it is 
unsatisfactory to the public.  Given the prominence of the legal process approach to 
constitutional review of state regulatory action in the post-New Deal era, however, judicial 
passivity remains attractive, if unromantic, to judicial actors.  Ultimately, recognizing the Court’s 
shift away from defining constitutional property rights via the Takings Clause offers important 
descriptive and prescriptive insights into the future of takings law in the Roberts Court, 
especially if a majority of justices decide to tighten review of eminent domain actions or 
otherwise heighten judicial review under the Takings Clause.
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1[S]o we have to eat crow no matter what we do.  Right?
- Justice Antonin Scalia, from the oral argument in 
Lingle v. Chevron (2005)1
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s understanding and enforcement of the Takings Clause got 
unexpectedly weird in the October 2004 term.2  Not so long ago, following the Supreme Court’s 
four takings decisions in its 1986-87 term3 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission
(1992),4 the Takings Clause appeared ready to serve as a tool for the rollback of the regulatory 
state.5  This vision proved illusory.  Instead of a sharp, anti-statist tool, by October 2004 the 
regulatory takings doctrine had come to resemble a sprawling experimental novel—poised to 
resolve the deepest conflicts of modern life, yet filled with repetitious and highly technical 
language that has never fully revealed the doctrine’s intent and implications, and understood only 
by adepts able to master its subtle intricacies.6  Judges and academics had come to expect, if not 
1 2005 WL 529658 (Feb. 22, 2005) (oral argument in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005)).
2 The Takings Clause, the Fifth Amendment, provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.  It serves both to limit the exercise of eminent domain and to 
require compensation for confiscatory regulations, and its application extends to state and federal governments.  See
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897); DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. 
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 2-5 (2002).
3 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (condition that property owner dedicate 
easement to public in order to receive land use approval effected a taking because the easement failed to bear an 
essential nexus to the government’s purpose in requiring condition); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (remedy for regulatory takings violation is compensation, and property 
owner may recover damages for taking during the period in which the regulation was in place); Hodel v. Irving, 481 
U.S. 704 (1987) (federal program that required small fractional ownership interests in tribal land escheat to tribe 
upon owner’s death effected a taking by seizing one of the essential rights of property ownership, the right to pass 
on property to heirs); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (legislation that 
required coal companies to leave in place coal where mining would cause subsidence of surface did not effect a 
taking).
4 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The property owner won in Lucas, and property owners won three of the four 
decisions in the 1986-87 Term (Nollan, First English, and Hodel), while the only government victory was in 
Keystone Bituminous, a seemingly anomalous decision that appeared to reverse the result in the first modern takings 
case, decided by Justice Holmes in 1922, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5 This perception was most closely associated with Richard Epstein’s influential book Takings.  See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); see generally
Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591, 
641-63 (1998) (offering political and jurisprudential history of takings jurisprudence, with emphasis on its 
increasingly conservative cast after the Warren Court). 
6 Supreme Court justices themselves often make this complaint.  See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 
U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (“[I]t is fair to say [that 
regulatory takings] has proved difficult to explain in theory and to implement in practice. Cases attempting to decide 
when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law.”); Nollan, 483 U.S. 
at 866 (Stevens J., dissenting) (“Even the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the 
scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence.”); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 
(1978) (identifying a regulatory taking “has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty”).  These complaints 
2accept, the doctrine’s evolving complexity.  At the same time, the Public Use Clause’s prospects 
as a substantive limit on the exercise of eminent domain appeared dormant, if not dead.7  But in 
three decisions issued in May and June 2005, the Court signaled broad consensus favoring an 
end to major doctrinal development in regulatory takings while it cut the doctrine back at its 
margins;8 and, paradoxically, revealed a dramatic and bitter split among the justices over the 
meaning and bite of the public use limitation on eminent domain.9  And while the regulatory 
takings cases—which Court-watchers once awaited eagerly—were issued with hardly any notice, 
the eminent domain decision provoked a torrent of public outcry.  This appears, on its face, to 
constitute an odd reversal, one that cries out for theoretical explanation and prescriptive 
intervention.
Alas, the search for coherence in takings jurisprudence has resulted in a multitude of 
theories but no consensus.  Each theory—whether based on conceptions of common law property 
rights or constitutional conceptions of justice, or based on utility, natural law, or communitarian 
or republican conceptions of the good—offers significant insight into the vexing legal, political, 
and normative issues that judicial enforcement of the Takings Clause raises.  But no single 
theory of property or of constitutional limits on state regulation and expropriation has proven 
capable either of satisfactorily rationalizing existing takings law or of persuading the courts or 
the theory’s opponents that its approach is best.  And as with their forbearers in the pantheon of 
Supreme Court takings decisions, the decisions from 2005 failed to confirm the supremacy of 
any one existing theory or approach.
The 2005 decisions do cohere—only not in the way we might think, expect, or even 
prefer.  They make plain that when faced with the difficult political and jurisprudential issues 
raised by the relationship between private property and the regulatory state, the Court’s greatest 
concern is with itself—that is, with the role of federal judicial review in a tri-partite, federalist 
system.  The Court has abandoned the difficult, if not impossible, task of providing a clear 
normative justification for the Takings Clause in favor of preserving and furthering its vision of 
an institutional system of governance.  It has preferred to direct its takings jurisprudence towards 
the question of who should decide rather than towards the substantive issue of what should be 
decided.  In short, the Court has chosen to adopt a “legal process” approach to takings—a 
are nothing, however, compared to those lodged in the law reviews.  For a recent comprehensive citation to that 
literature, see Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 97 n.2 
(2002). 
7 See Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 
39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251 (2004) (reporting that in the period between 1986 and 2003, the vast majority of 
federal courts and a smaller, but still large majority of state courts upheld proposed takings against challenge under 
public use clause); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 96 (1986) 
[hereinafter Merrill, Economics of Public Use] (reporting that in the period between 1954-1986, no federal courts 
and only a small minority of state courts held that a proposed taking failed to serve a public use).
8 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074 (2005) (invalidating test for regulatory takings that asks 
whether a regulatory act “substantially advances” a legitimate state interest); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005) (under full faith and credit statute, a plaintiff whose federal 
regulatory takings claim is resolved by a state court is precluded from re-litigating the claim in federal court).
9 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (“public use” requirement for exercise of eminent 
domain under Fifth Amendment did not bar city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic 
development plan that would result in acquired property’s use for private development).
3jurisprudential commitment that did not begin in the 2005 decisions, but that has only become 
truly clear after them. 
The legal process approach to adjudication, with roots in the constitutional crisis raised 
by the New Deal, ascended within the post-war legal academy as an effort to elaborate a 
legitimating set of adjudicatory norms and institutional practices for the modern administrative 
state.10  Several of the legal process school’s most significant concepts form the core of the 2005 
decisions.  The legal process approach commanded that judges should rely on “reasoned 
elaboration” expressed in fulsome, consistent, and rational decisions;11 engage in a “maturing of 
collective thought” through the careful, incremental exercise of common law development;12
and, ultimately, create and protect a self-limiting judicial institution that performs those tasks in 
which it is competent.13  Courts, as one among many institutions of public and private 
governance, have specific competencies within which they have authority to settle specific, 
narrowly-focused questions; outside those competencies, however, courts should defer to the 
expert decisions of other institutions.  The fundamental questions for legal process adherents 
concern the “constitutive or procedural understandings or arrangements” and “institutionalized 
procedures” that serve as the source of substantive social arrangement and that enable those 
arrangements to operate effectively.14  Thus, the key questions for courts and legal academics 
concern which institutions should decide which questions, and what form and procedures should 
be used in those decisional processes.  The actual answers to those quests are significantly less 
important.
Each of the 2005 decisions inevitably concerned the allocation of decision-making 
authority within the institutionalized procedures of local land use decision-making.  In Kelo v. 
City of New London, its eminent domain case, the Court based its decision most clearly on the 
majority’s respect for longstanding precedent and on the issue of whether “public use” is a 
question better suited for legislative bodies or for courts.15  In San Remo v. City and County of 
San Francisco, the Court based its decision on whether state courts could provide sufficient 
review of claims brought under the federal constitutional takings clause, or whether judicial 
review by the lower federal courts should be made available to takings plaintiffs.16  And in 
Lingle v. Chevron, the Court both settled a niggling doctrinal issue by casting off an unreasoned 
test from a twenty-five year old decision, and provided an authoritative elaboration of the precise 
legal forms that compose the complicated regulatory takings doctrine.17  Decided unanimously, 
Lingle offered a settled logic, made operational through a mixture of default standards and 
categorical rules, by which courts should decide when and precisely how much to defer to the 
administrative decisions of federal, state, and local government agencies.  In sum, these 
decisions, which represent a nearly random sample of substantive and procedural takings issues, 
10 See infra notes 277-281.
11 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 145-50 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
12 Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 84, 100 (1959).
13 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 696, 1009-11.
14 Id. at 3-4.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 120-122.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 83-87.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 49-63.
4provide an institutional blueprint for the protection of constitutional property rights rather than a 
definition of the boundaries and normative justification of those rights.18
The article proceeds as follows.  Part I summarizes the 2005 decisions, placing them in 
the context of takings decisions of the past fifty years.  Part II sorts and summarizes prevailing 
theories of takings and explains the extent to which the Court relies on the competing rationales 
of fairness, utility, and the institution of property rights as a basis for its enforcement of the 
Takings Clause.  Reviewing the Court’s stated rationales for its 2005 decisions, I argue that the 
Court relies slightly on an abstract conception of fairness, somewhat more on property rights as 
an institution, and hardly at all on utilitarian rationales.  Part III shifts towards an institutionalist 
perspective by considering, but then rejecting as incomplete, an argument that federalist 
principles are the principal motivation behind the Court’s takings decisions.  In Part IV, I explain 
the legal process approach and demonstrate its remarkable salience throughout the 2005 
decisions, and then summarize the descriptive and predictive implications of this insight.  
Recognizing the legal process concepts at the core of the 2005 decisions enables a better 
understanding of the frustrations of takings doctrine for commentators, theorists, and property 
rights activists, and, at least with respect to Kelo, a large segment of the American public.  The 
recognition also identifies the jurisprudential limitations facing the Roberts Court if it decides to 
reinvigorate the Takings Clause as a powerful check on state actions.
I. Takings 2005
A. Pre-2005
Viewed as abstractly and uncontroversially as possible, takings doctrine and logic prior to 
the three decisions issued in the spring of 2005 had developed as follows.  The Takings Clause 
text is ambiguous,19 and the framers provided relatively little guidance as to their intent.20
18 The Fifth Amendment in fact contains two clauses that protect private property rights against interference 
by state actors: the aforementioned Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”).  Although the 2005 decisions and this Article occasionally 
discuss the Due Process Clause in its substantive manifestation, my concern with “constitutional property rights” 
extends only to how the Court has used its takings decisions to define them.  See, e.g., infra notes 49-52 (discussing 
Lingle’s distinction between the substantive due process and takings inquiries).  For a significant recent effort to 
provide a comprehensive and coherent theory of constitutional property rights that includes substantive and 
procedural due process rights to property and the Takings Clause, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of 
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000). 
19 By this I mean ambiguous as to at least two key issues: the meanings of the words “taken” and “public 
use.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”) 
(emphasis added).  As to “taken,” it was unclear until the twentieth century that the term “taken” extended outside 
the context of eminent domain; and, at the moment that the extension was recognized, the precise point at which a 
regulation effects a taking was immediately deemed a “question of degree” that could not be resolved “by general 
propositions.”  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).   As to “for public use,” which in the 
Fifth Amendment serves to modify “taken,” the phrase lends itself to multiple interpretations: the phrase might 
merely limit the Clause’s command to eminent domain actions generally; or it may require government to pay 
compensation only when it takes property for public uses rather than for private uses; or it may allow the 
government to take property only for public uses, while prohibiting takings for private uses.  Since the nineteenth 
century, courts have settled on the latter plausible interpretation as the correct one.  See DANA & MERRILL, supra
note 2, at 193-94.
5Neither English or colonial practices,21 nor the views of commentators who inspired the 
constitutional framers,22 nor the early years of the Clause’s enforcement by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and state supreme courts provide clear evidence of its meaning.23  In light of this 
confusion, two contested issues have come to predominate the Takings Clause’s modern 
development: the extent to which it requires compensation for government regulation that 
diminishes the value of private property (as opposed to the forced sale imposed on property 
owners via eminent domain); and the extent to which the “public use” phrase limits 
government’s power to “take” property through its power of eminent domain.24 These issues 
were at stake in two of the 2005 decisions.
With respect to regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has typically, although not 
universally, allowed government to regulate broadly against nuisance activities and thereby 
lower private property value without compensation, especially where the regulation provided
reciprocal benefits to the affected property owner.25  Over the course of the twentieth century, 
government entities, and especially local governments, expanded the use of their police powers 
to regulate a vast array of land uses through a myriad of planning techniques.  During this period, 
the Court had deferentially reviewed these regulatory efforts’ effects on individual property 
owners, although the Court had developed tests that require courts to apply more rigorous 
scrutiny for certain categories of regulations and regulatory effects.26  For regulations that do not 
fall within such categories, the Court had interpreted the Takings Clause to require compensation 
only when a regulation goes “too far,”27 a standard applied through “essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries.”28  Critics of the doctrine complain strenuously of its incoherence and vagueness.29
20 See Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531, 539-40 (1995).  But see
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 
AM. U. L. REV. 181, 192-206 (1999) (arguing that Madison’s writings provide sufficient evidence of the framers’ 
intent).
21 See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1252 (1996); William Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 557-66 
(1972).
22 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 19-25.
23 See John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 790 (1995).  The historiography of the origins and early understandings 
of the Takings Clause, which matured significantly in the early- and mid-1990s and found little evidence of strong 
judicial enforcement (see, e.g., Hart, supra, and Treanor, supra), has since been contested.  See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 137 (3d ed. 2005) (citing articles 
challenging Hart and Treanor’s work).  My purpose here is not to sort and evaluate the various historical claims, but 
to note that history does not dispositively provide an absolutely authoritative approach to the Takings Clause.
24 Admittedly, the narrative provided here ignores issues of just compensation and procedure.  I consider 
these important and frequently litigated issues, see DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 169 (noting that 
compensation challenges arise frequently in eminent domain litigation); 254-55 (noting the importance of procedural 
issues for the land development industry), throughout the article and omit them here only for purposes of narrative 
economy.
25 See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the “Harm/Benefit” and “Average Reciprocity of Advantage” Rules in a 
Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1458-72, 1490-1520 (1997); Andrea L. Peterson, The
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property 
Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 110-11 (1990).
26 See infra notes 63-64.
27 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
28 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
6Although the Rehnquist court seemed to shift towards imposing stronger constitutional property 
protections, the regulatory takings doctrine had not changed radically since its re-emergence in 
the 1978 Penn Central decision.30 As recently as 2002, the Court characterized its takings 
jurisprudence as a consistent effort to resist creating broad per se rules that would impose strict 
compensation requirements on regulatory entities.31
With respect to the public use issue in eminent domain, federal courts did not generally 
review eminent domain action during the nineteenth century, and state courts failed to enunciate 
a singular approach to the limits of government’s taking powers.32  During the twentieth century, 
and especially over the past fifty years, state and federal courts have allowed government entities 
to take land and ultimately give or sell the property to private individuals for a public purpose, 
rather than strictly for public use, so long as the government could demonstrate that the land was 
taken for a public purpose and would result in public benefits.33  More recently, property rights 
advocates have had some success in persuading state courts to scrutinize eminent domain 
actions, most prominently when the Michigan Supreme Court reversed an especially deferential 
public use precedent.34
The settled context for the Court’s 2005 decisions, then, featured regulatory takings as a 
complicated but increasingly stable area of law, and “public use” as a fairly simple, well-settled 
limit on eminent domain power.
B. Lingle: A Reasoned Elaboration of Regulatory Takings
At first glance, Lingle appears to be an uncontroversial effort at doctrinal housekeeping 
that is intended only to clarify whether courts should continue to apply a “would-be doctrinal 
rule or test” that had been repeated, though never directly applied, “in a half dozen or so” 
Supreme Court decisions.35  The decision is brief, clear, and unanimous—ironically, Lingle is 
probably the shortest takings decision since Agins v. City of Tiburon,36 the decision it revises, 
29 See Poirier, supra note 6, at 97-98 nn.2-3 (citing sources).  Some commentators have found virtue in the 
doctrine’s vagueness, however.  See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, in PROPERTY AND 
PERSUASION 199, 219-21 (1994); Poirier, supra note 6, at 150-83.
30 Commentators on the right and left have come to this conclusion. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private 
Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187 (2004) (conservative natural rights advocate expressing 
profound disappointment); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1437-38 (1993) (liberal environmentalist noting the limits 
of the Rehnquist Court’s efforts to reconstruct property and takings law).
31 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 
(2002).
32 See generally Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203,
204-14 (1978) (describing minor role for federal courts prior to the Fourteenth Amendment’s extension of Fifth 
Amendment rights under the Takings Clause to states).
33 See James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, “Public Use,” and New Directions in Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 845, 850-53.
34 See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (reversing Poletown Neighborhood 
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)); Southwestern Illinois Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City 
Environmental, L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002).  See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Public Use Requirement and 
Doctrinal Renewal, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10999 (2004) (noting reversal of judicial deference towards eminent domain 
actions for economic development).
35 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2077-78.
36 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
7and the first major takings decision since Agins to be issued without a significant concurrence or 
dissent.37  Under review in Lingle was Hawaii’s legislative effort to cap the amount of rent that 
an oil company could charge dealers to whom the company leased its gas stations.  The 
legislation was enacted in order to address concerns about the price effects of market 
concentration in retail gasoline sales.38  In its complaint challenging the legislation, Chevron, the 
Lingle plaintiff, included, among other claims, an allegation that the legislation effected a facial 
taking of its property for which compensation was due.39  For this claim, Chevron relied upon the 
first prong of a test that had originated in the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, which stated that a legislative act effects a taking if it “does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests, . . . or [it] denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”40
After a trial at which each side called expert witnesses to testify to the legislation’s 
practical effect, the federal district court ultimately accepted the view of Chevron’s economist 
that the rent cap provision would not advance the state’s interest in protecting consumers from 
high gasoline prices, and would in fact result in a price increase.41  Indeed, the only issue for 
which the district court granted summary judgment, and the only issue on appeal, was the 
plaintiff’s claim that the regulation, on its face, failed to advance the purpose for which the 
government had adopted it.42  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the 
legal standard to Chevron’s facial taking claim, and, ultimately, its finding that a taking had 
occurred.43 Consistent with some state and federal appellate courts’ application of Agins,44
37 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lingle was very brief and unsubstantial.  See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2087 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); infra note 66.
38 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2078.
39 Id. at 2079.
40 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
41 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (D.Haw. 2002).   The expert reasoned that 
oil companies would most likely raise wholesale gasoline prices to offset losses resulting from the rental cap.  See 
id.  The case had been remanded to the district from the Ninth Circuit following an appeal of the district court’s 
earlier grant of summary judgment to Chevron.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 
(D.Haw. 1998).  The remand required the court to settle a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the state’s rent 
cap legislation would benefit consumers.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1037-42 (9th Cir. 
2000).
42 See Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1014; see also Brief for Respondent at *1-*3, Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2074 
(No. 04-163), 2005 WL 103793 (focusing almost exclusively on whether legislation “substantially advances  a 
legitimate state interest,” while noting only cursorily that plaintiff had been deprived of property from rent cap);
Brief of Appellee, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-15867), 2002 WL 
32290809 (same).
43 The Ninth Circuit twice upheld the legal standard that the District Court used.  See Chevron, 363 F.3d at 
849-55; Chevron, 224 F.3d at 1033-37.
44 See, e.g., Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1997) (invalidating 
affordable housing ordinance for failure to substantially advance a state interest); cf. Clajon Production Corp. v. 
Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1579 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Agins test to conclude that restriction on issuance of hunting 
licenses to out-of-state hunters substantially advanced Wyoming’s legitimate interest in conserving game animals 
for its residents); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (N.Y. 2004) (applying Agins test to conclude 
that restriction on development in conservation areas substantially advanced Town’s legitimate interest in preserving 
environmentally sensitive areas); Sheffield Development Company, Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 
677 (Tex. 2004) (holding that Agins test remained authoritative and, as such, City’s downzoning and moratorium on
development of landowner’s parcel substantially advanced City’s interest in avoiding ill effects of urbanization).
8though counter to the majority of law review commentary,45 the lower courts in Lingle read the 
test disjunctively to mean that compensation was due if a plaintiff could show that the 
government regulation failed either prong of the test—even in the absence of evidence that the 
regulation, as applied, diminished the use or value of plaintiff’s property. 
The question presented to the Supreme Court in Lingle was whether the Agins
“substantially advances” test was an “appropriate” one for determining whether a regulation 
effects a taking.46  The “substantially advances” test did not belong within takings jurisprudence, 
the Court reasoned, because of what the test allowed property owners to plead under the Fifth 
Amendment and because of what it required courts to do as part of their review of the property 
owners’ claims.  Having incorrectly articulated the test in the disjunctive as two distinct 
inquiries—that is, a plaintiff could plead under either the “substantially advances” or the denial 
of an economically viable use test—Agins allowed a property owner to allege that a regulatory 
act effects a taking solely on the basis of the character of the government’s action, and without 
reference to whether the act had any economic effect on the use of his land.47  Furthermore, the 
“substantially advances” test, especially as applied without reference to the regulation’s effect on 
the owner’s property, invited courts to scrutinize the purpose, wisdom, and functionality of a 
regulatory act in an open-ended and potentially rigorous way.48
The Agins test thus fundamentally mistook the nature and purpose of the Takings Clause, 
Lingle held, and, in the process, made three fundamental errors.  The first error was categorical.  
Judicial review of a government act’s functionality and wisdom belongs within a substantive 
Due Process test rather than a takings test.49  The second error was procedural: the test focused 
on the wrong details and as a result mistook the Takings Clause’s normative purpose.  A 
complaint alleging that a regulation fails to “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest 
sheds no light on the key issues of takings analysis, which are “the magnitude or character of the 
burden a particular regulation imposes upon property owners” and how such burden “is 
distributed among property owners.”50  A property owner’s takings claim must identify the 
property owner’s loss and individualized burden rather than of the government’s mistake.  Third, 
the test misconceptualized the role of judicial review because it “would empower—and might 
often require—courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and 
expert agencies.”51  The “substantially advances” test thus miscasts the court as a super-
legislature, able to second-guess and overrule the decisions of elected officials. As a result of 
45 See John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate Governmental Interest 
Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853 (1999); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of 
Underlying Principles, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1328-33 (1989); Edward J. Sullivan, Emperors and Clothes: The 
Genealogy and Operations of the Agins Tests, 33 URB. LAW. 343 (2001). But see R. S. Radford, Of Course a Land 
Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 
ENVTL. L. REV. 353 (2004). 
46 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2078.
47 Id. at 2083-84.
48 Id. at 2085-86.
49 Id. at 2083-84.  This confusion, the Court conceded, extended beyond Agins, and the Court only began to 
correct it in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), 
when it disentangled the origins of regulatory takings and declared it to be in the Takings Clause rather than in 
substantive due process.  See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2983 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197-99).
50 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2084.
51 Id. at 2085.
9applying the wrong substantive legal standard, which forces courts to scrutinize the cause and 
mechanism of the regulatory act rather than its effects, the Agins test “has no proper place in our 
takings jurisprudence.”52
This conclusion assumes, of course, that there is a singular takings jurisprudence out of 
which the Agins test could be cast—a contested proposition, to say the least.53  By sorting and 
reasonably elaborating history, doctrine, and normative justification appears, the Court 
confidently stated that a coherent regulatory takings jurisprudence indeed exists, and cast Lingle
as an ending—the end, ultimately, of the complicated common law development of regulatory 
takings, at least as a major jurisprudential and political undertaking.  It presented this coherence 
in two ways: as an unbroken historical narrative of doctrinal development, and as a singular, 
cohesive doctrine.
This historical narrative looks substantially as follows.  No regulatory takings doctrine 
existed until Mahon, when Justice Holmes articulated his “storied but cryptic formulation” 
therein that a regulation that “‘goes too far’” effects a taking.54  “Beginning with Mahon,” a 
limited regulatory takings doctrine emerged, requiring compensation in those rare instances 
when a regulation is “so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or 
ouster.”55 Penn Central forms the key precedent for the regulatory takings doctrine and the 
default standard for the judicial review of takings claims,56 and the categorical exceptions to 
Penn Central, which identify particular regulatory acts as constituting per se takings are outlying 
instances, mere exceptions that prove the centrality of the Penn Central test.  Viewed in 
retrospect within the trajectory of this narrative, the decisions establishing the respective 
categories, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 57 (total diminution in value) and Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.58 (physical invasion), and Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission59 and Dolan v. City of Tigard60 (individualized development conditions that require 
dedication of land), did not signal a radical departure from judicial deference—or, as we can now 
see from Lingle’s sweeping narrative, from the grand progression established by Penn Central
and continued over the next three decades to the present.61 Lingle thus appeared to reject any 
52 Id. at 2087.
53 Lingle was not itself a radical departure from recent decisions; in fact, it echoed and cited similar 
statements by six justices in Tahoe-Sierra.  See 535 U.S. at 323-27.  But unlike Tahoe-Sierra, Lingle was the rare 
takings case that attracted every justice.
54 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2081 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 2082 (characterizing the Penn Central factors as “the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory 
takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules.”); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central
itself. . . .”); see also Tahoe Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 n.23 (quoting “polestar” statement from Palazzolo concurrence).
57 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
58 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
59 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
60 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
61 Significantly, Justice Scalia’s decision in Lucas, seen generally as an effort to depart from the Penn Central
narrative, itself helped solidify it.  Lucas first conceded that the regulatory takings doctrine was a modern invention 
established first in Mahon as an effort to curb government overreach and protect private property.  See Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1014. What began as an effort to naturalize the Lucas holding that a regulation depriving a property owner 
of all economic value effects a taking unless the government can identify “background principles of nuisance and 
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more expansive vision of the normative purpose for the Takings Clause’s application to 
regulatory takings beyond compensating property owners for exceptionally burdensome 
regulation.  Although this conclusion was foreshadowed in both Palazzolo v. Rhode Island62 and
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,63 the unanimous 
decision in Lingle appears to provide a stronger sense of closure.
The cohesive doctrine looks substantially as follows.  Presented with a regulatory act 
whose effects fall within certain enumerated categories that represent “functional equivalences” 
to the “paradigmatic taking” of eminent domain for which compensation is always required, a 
court must apply heightened scrutiny.64  These categories, which include permanent physical 
invasions, complete diminutions in value, and regulatory conditions imposing permanent 
physical invasions, are narrow and finite in number.  But presented with regulatory acts whose 
effects fall outside of these categories, courts must apply a deferential balancing test.65  Because 
it must look only to regulatory effects, a court adjudicating a takings claim does not consider 
what the “substantially advances” test requires: judicial review of a regulation in isolation from 
consideration of its effects on property and the rights of ownership, and rigorous scrutiny of a 
regulatory act’s wisdom and effects.66   Using Lingle as the occasion to strike the “substantially 
advances” test, then, the Court clarified, solidified, and narrowed its regulatory takings doctrine.
Indeed, Lingle reads not unlike the final chapter of a mystery novel in which the detective 
reveals all of the clues that led to the crime’s solution and faces no contradiction from any of the 
other characters—including the police commissioner who doggedly pursued a different theory of 
the crime.67  To resolve the viability of the Agins two-part test, the majority cast Agins ’ 
disjunctive test out of the takings narrative by parsing the doctrine’s progression and cleaning up 
some loose ends.  Thus, earlier decisions that either confused the Due Process and Takings 
Clauses, or that imported due process concepts into the adjudication of a takings claim ceased to 
property law” that restrict the owner’s use of the property, see id. at 1026-32, ultimately became in Lingle a
contained, rarely invoked application of the nuisance exception to a compensation requirement.
62 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
63 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  See Laura Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of
Property and Justice , 21 CONST. COMMENTARY ___ (forthcoming, 2005)(manuscript at 6-10, on file with author), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=820266. 
64 Id. at 2081.
65 Id. at 2081-82.
66 Id.  In a brief solo concurrence, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that a regulation like that 
challenged in Lingle might be “so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process” rather than the Takings Clause.  
Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
67 Here, the dogged police commissioner is played by property rights advocates who clung to the 
“substantially advance” test as evidence that a different, more expansive Takings Clause still existed and awaited 
exhumation.  See, e.g., R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails To Substantially Advance 
Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 353 (2004) (asserting that 
substantial advancement test was a part of the “mainstream” takings doctrine); Larry Salzman, Twenty-Five Years of 
the Substantial Advancement Doctrine Applied to Regulatory Takings: From Agins to Lingle v. Chevron, 35 ENVTL. 
L. REV. 10481, 10483 (2005) (arguing, prior to the Court’s decision in Lingle, that the Court used the substantial 
advance test as a “cause-effect” test of regulations that imposed real constitutional constraints on local governments 
while it steered clear of Lochner-style judicial review).
11
be takings cases.68 Agins, and its suggestion of judicial scrutiny of a regulation’s wisdom, had 
been a red herring. We know that now because finally, after Lingle, we understand regulatory 
takings as the doctrine that justifiably and correctly enforces the narrow normative commands of 
the Fifth Amendment.
C. San Remo: The Settled Institutions of Takings Litigation
San Remo v. City of San Francisco also required the Court to consider the implications of 
an earlier regulatory takings decision.  In its 1985 decision Williamson County Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 69 the Court held that in order to ripen a federal 
constitutional takings claim alleging that the application of a regulation required compensation, a 
claimant must “seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.”70
Courts have read Williamson County as requiring claimants to raise all of their state claims in 
state court before their federal takings claims are ripe for adjudication in federal court.71  The 
San Remo petitioners, hotel owners forced by the city of San Francisco to pay a high fee to 
convert their business from long-term residential rentals to short-term tourist uses,72 strategically 
filed and preserved federal constitutional takings claims in order to have those claims heard in a 
federal forum rather than in state court.73  Some federal circuits, most prominently the Ninth 
Circuit, had previously held that where a takings claim has been litigated first in state court in the 
adjudication of takings issues under state law, and state law and federal constitutional law are 
coextensive or substantively equivalent, then the federal court is precluded from reconsidering 
the issues.74  In the San Remo litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Supreme 
Court’s ruling on the property owners’ substantive as-applied claims under state takings law 
constituted an “‘equivalent determination’ of such claims under the federal takings clause,” and 
thus precluded the lower federal courts from reconsidering the claims under circuit precedent.75
68 See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2083-84 (classifying the early zoning decisions, e.g., Village of Euclid, Ohio v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), as due process 
cases, rather than as takings cases, and criticizing language in other decisions that seemed to “commingl[e] . . . due 
process and takings inquiries. . . .”).
69 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
70 Id. at 194.
71 See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2501 (assuming Williamson County requires a “final state judgment” before a 
federal takings claim becomes ripe in federal court); id. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing 
that Willamson County requires a claimant to seek compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings in 
federal court, but questioning whether decision was correct).  Numerous federal circuits had come to the same 
conclusion. See, e.g., Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 808 (1996); Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1093 (1994); National Advertising Co. v. City and County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405, 413-14 (10th Cir. 1990).
72 San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
73 See id. at 2496-2500 (recounting the litigation’s procedural history).
74 See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998).  Not all circuits were in agreement 
on this issue.  See Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that it would be “both ironic and unfair” if the takings ripeness rule precluded claimants from ever bringing 
a Fifth Amendment takings claim).
75 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004).  
Petitioners’ facial challenge to the city’s regulations could have been insulated from preclusion because it did not 
face the ripeness requirement that their as-applied challenge did under Williamson County.  See San Remo, 125 S. 
Ct. at 2503 (citing San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998)).  Because petitioners raised the facial 
issue in state court, however, they did not properly reserve it under England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 
375 U.S. 411 (1964).  See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2503 (discussing San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 106-09 (Cal. 2002)).
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For many property rights advocates and takings plaintiffs’ attorneys, this result unfairly 
excludes takings claims from beginning in the lower federal courts.76  Worse, they argue, a 
claimant may never have her specific Fifth Amendment takings claim heard if a federal court 
finds that state and federal law are coextensive and that the state court adjudication of the state 
law takings claim (which was required under Williamson County) was identical to a federal 
takings claim.77  Where a property owner is convinced that she cannot get a fair hearing from her 
state’s courts and views the federal judiciary as her only opportunity for a fair hearing, the 
preclusive effect of a state court determination appears to the property owner to be exceptionally 
unjust.78  In their brief before the Court, the San Remo petitioners argued that “‘federal courts 
[should be] required to disregard the decision of the state court’ in order to ensure that federal 
takings claims can be ‘considered on the merits in . . . federal court.’”79
In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision for the entire Court,80 Justice Stevens 
characterized the question presented as whether federal courts may “craft an exception” to the 
Full Faith and Credit Statute81 for claims brought under the Takings Clause.82  By redrafting the 
question,83 Justice Stevens neatly rejected petitioners’ characterization of the issue as one of 
righting procedural unfairness.  Framing the issue in this manner and responding to it as 
reframed, the Court’s decision did not focus specifically on the substantive issue of property 
rights; rather, the decision and its reasoning involved judicial comity, efficiency, and a restrained 
76 See, e.g., Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There From Here: Supreme 
Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671 
(2004); J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the England 
Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to 
Ripe Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 240- 43 (2003); Madeline J. Meacham, The Williamson
Trap, 32 URB. LAW. 239 (2000); George A. Yuhas, The Ever-Shrinking Scope of Federal Court Takings Litigation, 
32 URB. LAW. 465 (2000). 
77 See Berger & Kanner, supra note 76, at 687-688; Breemer, supra note 76, at 240; Meacham, supra note 76, 
at 241; Yuhas, supra note 76, at 474.
78 See Breemer, supra note 76, at 260-63 (describing California’s procedural and substantive barriers to 
receiving compensation under state law).
79 San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2501 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 8, 14, San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2491 (No. 04-
340)).
80 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, which was joined by three other justices, called for the Court to 
reconsider Williamson County’s state litigation requirement, but did not question the majority’s conclusion that state 
court takings judgments have a preclusive effect on federal courts where state and federal law are coextensive.  See
id. at 2507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
81 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).  The Full Faith and Credit Statute provides that “judicial proceedings . . . shall 
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of such State. . . .”  Id.  The statute was originally enacted in 1790 as a 
Congressional response to Article IV, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which states, “Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress 
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the 
Effect thereof.”  See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
82 San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2495. 
83 The Court initially granted certiorari in San Remo on the question of whether “a Fifth Amendment Takings 
claim [is] barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which was 
rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the federal Takings claim.” Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at *i, San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2491 (No. 04-340), 2004 WL 2031862.
13
interpretation of legislation,84 while the virtual unavailability of a federal forum raised no 
substantive concern.  Nothing prevents takings plaintiffs from raising their federal constitutional 
claims in state court, the Court reasoned, and state courts are fully capable of adjudicating 
federal constitutional claims.85  Plaintiffs can in turn appeal an adverse state court ruling to the 
U.S. Supreme Court—a process that existed long before Williamson County, and that was the 
route through which Mahon itself began the modern regulatory takings saga.86  If state 
adjudication of state law claims also resolves federal constitutional claims, so much the better—
everyone saves the time and money involved in repetitious litigation.  Furthermore, because state 
courts have more experience at resolving the complex questions that land use disputes raise, their 
resolution will likely be more expert and fairer than those of federal courts.87  The Court’s 
understanding of the constitutional scheme and its prescription for an optimal system of 
adjudication commands that state courts serve as the first, and perhaps only, setting for litigation.
The Court rejected the property owner’s account of Kafkaesque unfairness—my property 
has been confiscated and the courthouse door has been slammed shut!—and substituted the 
abstract vision of a functional and efficient system of federal governance. Takings litigation must 
begin and may end in state court; the courthouse doors are open, but property owners do not get 
to choose the one through which they enter and from which they exit; and in any event, the 
choice of doors for entrance and exit has no significant effect on outcome.  The Court’s account 
assumes that state courthouses are at worst interchangeable with federal courts and, at best, are 
better suited as institutions to handle the state and local issues implicated in a takings claim.  The 
adjudication of property disputes, therefore, is subsumed within questions of justiciability, 
jurisdiction, and court bureaucracy, and largely ignores the plaintiff’s concerns regarding a fair 
hearing.
A concurrence threatened to challenge the system of adjudication the majority upheld. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, wrote separately 
to declare that he was not persuaded of the constitutional necessity of Williamson County’s 
84 See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2505 (refusing to read an exemption into the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S. 
§ 1738 (2000), where Congress has not expressed any such intent, and therefore applying “our normal assumption 
that the weighty interests in finality and comity” to dismiss petitioners’ claim that they needed access “to an 
additional appellate tribunal”).
85 To provide a more detailed explanation, the Court disposed of petitioners’ argument in several ways.  First, 
the Court held that the reservation of federal claims for adjudication in federal court pending the resolution of state 
claims in state court, which the Court expressly allowed in England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 375 
U.S. 411 (1964), only allowed reservation and reassertion of federal claims in federal court when plaintiffs confined 
the scope of the state court’s inquiry to issues of state law.  See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2502-03.  Because the 
petitioners had chosen to broaden the issues reviewed by the state court beyond those of state law, their reservation 
of federal takings claims did not fall within England’s parameters.  Id. at 2503.  Second, the Court noted that it had 
“repeatedly held” that plaintiffs can be deprived of the opportunity to litigate claims in federal court if the issues 
have already been “actually decided” in state court, even when plaintiffs had been sent to state court in order to ripen 
a claim.  Id. at 2504-05 (discussing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)).  To hold otherwise, the Court stated, would create an exception to the Full Faith and 
Credit Statute without Congressional authorization.  Id. at 2505-06.  Finally, the Court asserted that state courts are 
“fully competent” to hear federal constitutional claims arising from local land use decisions and “undoubtedly have 
more experience” in resolving such issues.  Id. at 2507. 
86 Id. at 2506.
87 Id. at 2507.
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litigation requirement (as opposed to its administrative exhaustion requirement).88  The 
requirement that property owners exhaust state judicial remedies before proceeding in federal 
court instead may be merely prudential, Justice Rehnquist suggested, and the Court should 
reconsider the expansiveness of Williamson County’s ripeness rule.89 Without directly 
challenging the majority’s assertion that state courts could constitute a proper setting for takings 
litigation, the concurrence questioned why they would constitute the only setting—a rule that 
Williamson County has been read to create and that San Remo acknowledges.90  Conceding that 
the Court had previously held that some federal constitutional challenges to state government 
action were barred from federal court,91 why, the concurrence asked, must takings claims against 
the application of land use regulations be relegated to state court when First Amendment and 
Equal Protection Clause challenges to land use actions could begin in federal court?92 If speech 
and equal protection could trump the majority’s vision of an integrated, seamless system of 
constitutional adjudication within a federal system, why not property?
But ultimately, as with Lingle, San Remo appears consistent with precedent in both 
doctrine and spirit.  The Court in both decisions reaffirmed and appears to have further secured 
its narrow approach to regulatory takings for reasons of administrative and bureaucratic 
competence, discretion, and efficiency.  Unlike Lingle’s surprising unanimity, however, the 
concurrence’s invitation to future takings plaintiffs to present the Court with an argument about 
Williamson County’s state court litigation requirement in the foreground makes the approach to 
takings procedure not quite as secure as Justice Stevens’s opinion appears. 
D. Kelo: Institutional Competency and Public Use
Returning to issues the Court had last confronted two decades before, Kelo concerned the 
extent to which the “public use” limitation in the Takings Clause restricts government from using 
its eminent domain power to further economic development and raise revenue in an 
economically distressed city.93  The petitioners in Kelo were longtime homeowners who 
challenged an eminent domain action initiated by the City of New London, Connecticut.94  As 
part of an extensive economic development plan, the city hoped to redevelop riverfront property 
and adjacent parcels on which Pfizer, a pharmaceutical company, planned to build a global 
research facility.95  The development plan called for construction of, among other things, a 
hotel/conference center, a technology park, and retail space, all of which would be privately 
owned and operated.96  Petitioners’ land was targeted for use as privately operated research and 
office space and, more vaguely, as “park support” and perhaps parking lots.97 The city authorized 
88 See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2509-10 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 2509.
91 See id. at 2508 (citing Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S 100, 116 (1981) 
(holding that taxpayers are “barred by the principle of comity” from asserting constitutional challenges to state tax 
systems in federal court)).
92 See id. at 2509 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Cleburne, 
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); 
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
93 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2658.
94 Id. at 2660.
95 See id. at 2658-59.
96 See id. at 2659-60.
97 See id. 
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the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit, to utilize the city’s eminent 
domain power to take whatever property it could not privately purchase in order to assemble land 
for the proposed project.98  Among the allegations included in the suit they filed in state court, 
the Kelo homeowners claimed that the city’s taking failed to meet the public use requirement of 
the federal constitution because it took land from private individuals only to give it, ultimately, 
to another private individual for the latter’s private use.99  Overruling a state trial court that had 
invalidated under the Fifth Amendment some but not all of the proposed eminent domain 
actions, the Connecticut Supreme Court, by a 4-3 margin, upheld all of the city’s proposed 
takings for economic development as actions taken “in the public interest” and for a “public 
use.”100
Writing for only four other justices, Justice Stevens upheld the city’s actions, based—like 
Lingle and San Remo—on the weight of precedent and the institutional settlement and relative 
competencies of the political and judicial actors involved in land use regulation and federal 
constitutional adjudication under existing precedent.  But of the three 2005 takings decisions that 
preached obedience to doctrinal stability and concern about the correct role for the federal 
constitution and federal courts, Kelo engendered by far the most internal protest and external 
criticism, as both Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, and Justice Thomas, writing only for himself, authored vigorous dissents.  
The dispute between majority and dissent over precedential authority focused on two 
decisions: Berman v. Parker (1954),101 in which the Court upheld the taking of allegedly non-
blighted property as part of a larger redevelopment plan;102 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff (1984),103 in which the Court upheld efforts by a state agency to reform patterns of land 
ownership in Hawaii that forcibly transferred fee title from lessors to lessees.  A unanimous 
decision in Midkiff authoritatively declared that the Court had “long ago rejected any literal 
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.”104  Under long-
settled law, then, the “public use” limitation would prohibit a “purely private taking” but allow 
the use of eminent domain for a “public purpose.”105  The fact that a taking for economic 
development purposes leaves the taken property in private hands does not render the taking’s 
primary purpose any less public—particularly where, as in Kelo (and Berman), the taking was 
part of an authorized, “carefully formulated,” comprehensive plan for redevelopment.106
According to the majority, the Public Use Clause merely sorts eminent domain actions based 
upon their purpose, not upon their results or the mechanics of the taking.107
98 See id. at 2659.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 2660-61 (discussing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 515-21, 527 (Conn. 2004)). 
101 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
102 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2665-66 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-35).
103 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
104 Id. at 244.
105 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2662-64.
106 Id. at 2664-66.
107 Id. at 2666.
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The two dissents disagreed, although in different ways and for quite different reasons.108
Justice O’Connor conceded that the takings upheld in Berman and Midkiff had not resulted in 
pure public ownership and use of the taken land, but she placed the majority’s decision outside 
the limits established in Berman and Midkiff.109  Unlike the blighted property in Berman, or the 
oligarchic pattern of property ownership in Midkiff, New London’s eminent domain actions took 
land for economic development purposes where the pre-taking land use did not inflict 
“affirmative harm on society.”110  Having extended those precedents beyond their limits, the 
majority had left “public use” a toothless limit that is now unable to invalidate any eminent 
domain actions—even one that would take property from one individual and give it to another 
for no public purpose at all.111
Justice Thomas also conceded that binding precedent required an expansive 
understanding of public use, but unlike his fellow dissenters, he rejected Berman and Midkiff as 
catastrophically mistaken.  At the turn of the twentieth century, Justice Thomas argued, the Court 
had taken a wrong turn when it replaced the plain meaning of the constitutional text’s Public Use 
Clause with an amorphous “public purpose” test.112  Rejecting a premise upon which the modern 
interpretation of the Takings Clause relies—that textual meaning, early history, and 
contemporaneous commentary are ambiguous and mixed with respect to the meaning of “public 
use”113—he recast the modern doctrinal trajectory as the tragic result of judicial acquiescence to 
legislative hubris.114  Justice O’Connor’s understanding of the Takings Clause, like the 
majority’s, cast the judiciary as a brake on the worst abuses of legitimate government authority; 
Justice Thomas, by contrast, viewed the Takings Clause as establishing a firm and broad 
constitutional limitation on the taken property’s ultimate use.115  “Purpose” was irrelevant for 
Justice Thomas; once the government’s authority is established under relevant federal 
constitutional or state law, then the only issue would be the kind of “use” the government 
planned for the taken land.  If the government or the public “actually uses the taken property,” 
then it is constitutionally permissible; anything less, such as land taken for economic 
development and given or sold to a private entity, is not.116  Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued 
108 Given the strong disagreements in their dissents, see text accompany infra notes 115-119, it is unclear why 
Justice Thomas joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent—indeed, it seems even less explicable than Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, which appears to depart from the majority opinion despite the fact that he signed on to Justice 
Stevens’s decision in its entirety.  See infra note 122.  I will treat Justice Thomas’s dissent as presenting separate 
and distinct arguments from Justice O’Connor’s, and will not attempt to reconcile them.
109 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2673-75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  To do so, Justice O’Connor was forced to disavow 
as dicta strongly deferential language from her own opinion in Midkiff, which declared that the public use 
requirement in the Takings Clause is “coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”  Id. at 2675 
(quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240).  Significantly, the majority decision neither relied upon, nor even cited, this 
language.
110 Id. at 2674-75.
111 Id. at 2675.
112 See id. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896)).
113 See supra notes 19-23, 32, 33 and accompanying text (arguing that text and historical evidence are 
ambiguous, if not conclusively in favor of an expanded reading of “public use,” which would include takings for a 
“public purpose”).
114 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2678-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting)  (arguing that the plain text and historical evidence 
make a narrow reading of “public use,” which would require taken land to be used by the government or public, the 
“most natural” one). 
115 Id. at 2680.
116 Id. at 2682.
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in favor of an antecedent inquiry into whether the government has the expressly enumerated 
power to engage in the proposed eminent domain action at all under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,117 thereby providing for a far more searching review than either the majority or dissent 
contemplates.118  For Justice Thomas, Berman and Midkiff should be ignored as “unreasoned” 
rather than respected and distinguished or reshaped as precedent.119
But the Kelo majority did not rely solely upon precedent in upholding New London’s 
eminent domain actions.  It also concluded that legislative authority, institutional competence, 
and the Court’s role in a federal system dictated finding the city’s actions permissible—and in so 
doing, the Court relied upon concerns similar to those that had proved pivotal in its Lingle and 
San Remo decisions.  Federal courts owed “respect” both to the legislative determinations of the 
state and local governments that authorized and carried out the eminent domain action and to the 
state court that upheld them.  This respect explains why the Court has neither developed “rigid 
formulas” nor engaged in “intrusive scrutiny” to second-guess elected state and local legislative 
determinations of the public needs and uses for takings.120  Even if it wanted to develop a formal 
rule for “public use,” the majority argued, it would be too difficult to develop a practical, 
enforceable test that would both successfully limit the use of condemned property for the benefit 
of the general public and sufficiently defer to state and local governments’ efforts to meet the 
ever-changing needs of society.121  Relative institutional competence and authority, coupled with 
the limits of legal form, dictate judicial deference.  Should citizens desire additional limits to 
eminent domain authority, the majority counseled, they could petition their state courts and 
politically elected legislatures to provide more rigorous judicial review under state constitutions 
or eminent domain statutes.122
The dissenters did not share the majority’s concerns about legal process and form.  For 
Justice O’Connor, “an external, judicial check” on the exercise of eminent domain, “however 
limited,” is necessary for the Public Use Clause in the Federal Constitution to have any 
meaning.123  She and her three fellow dissenters would find impermissible a “‘purely private 
taking’” that would, as in this case, take property that was not inflicting an affirmative harm on 
society and give it to another private entity.124  Like the majority, Justice O’Connor’s dissent 
would defer greatly to legislative judgments “[b]ecause courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the 
efficacy of proposed legislative initiatives.”125  Indeed, her approach would presumably uphold 
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
118 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 2687.
120 Id. at 2664 (majority opinion).
121 Id. at 2662.
122 See id. at 2668 nn. 22-23 (identifying states that had elected to limit eminent domain authority).  In a 
separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy articulated a test that would require courts to apply heightened scrutiny to a 
taking that the property owner plausibly alleges would benefit a private party, in order to make certain the taking 
was in fact reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose.  See id. at 2669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Because he also joined the majority, Justice Kennedy did not signal any fundamental disagreement with the Court’s 
decision.
123 Id. at 2673, 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2674 (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
125 Id. 
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takings that result in either public property (even if the pre-condemnation use was non-harmful) 
or that result in property formerly used for harmful purposes ending in private hands.126  But for 
both dissents, economic development takings produce adverse consequences that require 
correction under the Fifth Amendment: government entities captured by wealthy and powerful 
interests will take property from the poor and political minorities, resulting in the Motel 6 being 
taken for a Ritz-Carlton.127  Immediate and long-term damage to individual property owners and 
to the entire institution of private property, according to the dissenters, trumps concern about 
such systemic values as federalism and institutional competence.128
* * *
The 2005 decisions examined relatively narrow substantive and procedural issues relating 
to the regulatory takings doctrine, as well as a fundamental issue regarding the Public Use 
clause.  Strangely, each decision accomplishes something different from what one might have 
expected, given the questions they presented: resolving the narrow substantive regulatory takings 
issue prompted the Court to declare a unanimous agreement about the doctrine as a whole; 
resolving the procedural regulatory takings issue led the Court to agree unanimously about the 
judicial process for adjudicating takings claims, even as it revealed significant unease about that 
process; and reaffirming the existing approach to the Public Use clause produced not only a 
bitter, broad split among the justices, but also a public outcry against that longstanding approach.  
When the Court reviewed the different sets of precedents and reconsidered the particular legal 
and systemic questions that these disparate issues raised, it was pulled in different directions.  
Each of the three decisions, however, shared an underlying jurisprudential logic regarding the 
relative institutional competences operating in land use regulation, a logic that the remainder of 
this Article will explicate.  
II. Justifying Takings Law and the Search for Coherence
The case summaries and analysis in Part I signaled this Article’s ultimate argument that 
the Court views its takings jurisprudence as an institutional check on the legal processes of land 
use regulation.  Before the Article explicitly makes that argument in Part III and especially in 
Part IV, this Part sorts the prevailing theories that seek to justify either what the Court does, or 
what it should do, when it resolves takings claims.
126 Having so limited her approach, Justice O’Connor failed to reconcile the fact that Berman upheld the taking 
of non-harmful land that ended up in private hands.  See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954).  She merely 
acknowledges this fact and seems to approve Berman’s willingness to accept the government’s claim that the correct 
baseline for analysis was not parcel-by-parcel harm but neighborhood-by- neighborhood harm, whereby Berman’s 
property becomes harmful solely because it is surrounded by harmful uses.  But the taking is still of a non-harmful 
use, and therefore is inconsistent with her proposal. 
127 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2676-2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s dissent emphasized what he 
saw as the majority decision’s disproportionate effects on minorities.  See id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Such takings theories abound.  Some theorists have found coherence in Supreme Court 
decisions and either rejoice or fret over what they discover.129  Sometimes their lamentations 
subside a decade or more later;130 sometimes the reverse occurs and their once-triumphant tones 
turn frustrated and despondent.131  Others, having searched for coherence, claim to have found 
nothing and would impose something better.132  Still others are strangely satisfied with the 
muddle of it all, finding in doctrinal vagueness and incoherence a recognition of property’s 
inherent social and communitarian nature;133 or they declare this incoherence to be a symptom of 
the impossibility of resolving the intractable theoretical and political disputes that constitutional 
limits on the regulation of property raise.134  But each offers some underlying justification for its 
normative vision of takings jurisprudence.
This Part is in some ways a compendium of frustration, a snapshot of the intellectual 
spirit that attempts, against all odds, to make sense of takings as constitutional text and common 
law, and as a judicial check on regulatory overreach.  Although I concede that my tendency is to 
appreciate the muddle and find fault in rigid coherence—if only for its consequences, both 
anticipated and unanticipated—I have no axe to grind in this Part.135  Nor is my argument that 
the search to incorporate and apply some external normative theory from another discipline to 
the issue of constitutional property rights is an irrelevant, irresponsible, or illegitimate move for 
legal academics.136  My purpose instead is two-fold: first to summarize and explain the most 
significant efforts to justify a particular approach to takings, and then to note how the Court has 
either rejected, ignored, or invoked without conviction every coherent approach or theory that 
commentators have brought to bear on the issues.  This part is organized around the three 
dominant rubrics for understanding takings law: fairness, utilitarianism, and the validation and 
protection of property as a social and legal institution. 
A. Fairness Rationales
129 See, e.g., Gregory Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1752 (1988) 
(lamenting that the “dominant narrative” in takings law circa 1987 understands the Takings Clause as a necessary 
and powerful constitutional check on local regulators as all-powerful); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme 
Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 153-55 (1995) (celebrating that Court’s takings 
decisions articulate a logical, coherent approach that limits non-compensable regulation to nuisance and landowner 
actions that cause harm). 
130 See, e.g., Gregory Alexander, Ten Years of Takings, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 586, 593-94 (1996) (noting the 
limited nature of Court’s expansion of regulatory takings doctrine),
131 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs and Flows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case, 
2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 5, 28 (lamenting the fact that Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302, “has not left us with a pretty 
picture”).
132 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1080-81 (1993) (characterizing takings as the 
“doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle,” before proceeding to propose an approach that would require 
compensation when the government “conscripts someone’s property for state use”).
133 See, e.g., Poirier, supra note 6 (arguing that the vagueness in takings doctrine is socially and politically 
beneficial).
134 See James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997).
135 Elsewhere, I have argued that the Court’s efforts in its two exactions decisions to provide relatively precise 
rules to limit government regulations have resulted in a series of consequences that either fail to further the Court’s 
intended ends or that force local governments to under-regulate land use.  See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and 
Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609 (2004).
136 See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984); Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
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“Fairness”—which, along with utilitarian approaches, is the most generally accepted 
rationale for constitutional property rights protections137—appears in takings decisions and 
commentary in three guises.  In the Court’s most oft-cited rationale for its takings doctrines, 
fairness and justice serve as abstract principles that guide, but do not mandate or direct, legal 
rules.  In the second, which is more of a prominent rationale among commentators than in the 
Court’s decisions, the Takings Clause’s fairness rationale serves to protect a victim of a failed 
political process that has left her vulnerable to exploitation by a majoritarian decision.  And in 
the third, which some academic commentators propose, and which the popular protest against 
Kelo illustrates, fairness serves to validate popular or vernacular conceptions of property rights 
by protecting the expectations and norms of ordinary observers. 
1. Doctrinal Fairness: General Principles of Fairness and Justice
The concept of fairness in takings jurisprudence—which, the Court has stated, emanates 
from the Fifth Amendment itself—serves as the most significant and oft-cited justification for 
constitutional property rights protection.  The so-called “Armstrong principle,” which holds that 
the Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,”138 sets out a 
basic fairness rationale that helps explain the regulatory takings doctrine.139  The Court has also 
characterized the Takings Clause’s defense against unjust state action as protection from 
excessively intrusive regulation that “goes too far”140 or that, in its effects, lacks proportionality 
to the public’s needs.141  Unsurprisingly, the Court cited the Armstrong principle explicitly in 
Lingle, explaining that the principle’s conception of fairness serves a more fundamental role in 
Takings Clause jurisprudence than the “various justifications” that scholars have also attributed 
to regulatory takings.142
An analogous understanding of fairness also animates constitutional limitations on 
eminent domain.  The “just compensation” clause requires that the property owner be made 
whole to compensate fairly for her loss. The “public use” clause, as restated in the Calder v. Bull
principle, invalidates the taking of property from one individual merely to give it to another.143
By favoring one individual over another, the state imposes a severe burden on the less favored 
without any apparent legitimate purpose.  Accordingly, the state’s action is void, as the Court 
137 See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 997, 998-99 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181-82 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness].
138 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  
139 The Court invokes this language from Armstrong quite regularly, especially in its regulatory takings 
decisions. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
140 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
141 See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (“[C]oncerns 
for proportionality animate the Takings Clause.”); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29 (1998) (plurality 
opinion) (finding a regulatory taking where the retroactive burden was “substantially disproportionate to the parties’ 
experience”).  Proportionality appears more explicitly in the Court’s conditional approval of exactions cases which 
require that a condition on land development be roughly proportional to the development’s expected harms.  Dolan, 
512 U.S. at 391.
142 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2080; see also id. at 2081 (invoking also the “goes too far” language from Mahon, 260 
U.S. at 415).
143 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
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restated as recently as 1984.144  Again, the fairness principle is so essential to the Court’s 
understanding of the Takings Clause that the Kelo majority itself invoked the Calder principle, 
despite ruling against plaintiffs when the government defendant planned to transfer their taken 
land to a private entity.145  And the Armstrong and Calder fairness principles are 
interchangeable, as Justice O’Connor’s Kelo dissent made explicit.146
But the invocation of principles may be less meaningful than it appears.  Granted, the 
2005 decisions cited fairness as a justification for their results and for the doctrines they follow 
and establish.  But, as in earlier decisions, they did so more ritualistically than materially.  Most 
significantly, they failed to develop analytical or operational tools that would allow any of these 
fairness principles to matter.  
Kelo is most striking in this regard. For the Kelo dissenters, nothing could eclipse the 
manifest unfairness of the state’s actions, which in this case led government agencies to force the 
transfer of petitioners’ homes and parcels simply because their current residential uses were 
deemed insufficiently advantageous to New London’s coffers.147  Because of the Court’s 
willfully blind deference, the dissenters argued, government agencies can now simply take from 
those with fewer resources and give to those with more.148 If the Court’s invocation of abstract 
fairness principles actually drove their decision, Kelo would have established stricter 
enforcement of the Calder principle in order to protect against a state actor’s injustice to 
individual property owners—at least as the dissenters viewed both the principle and the facts in 
Kelo.149
But the majority found the dissenters’ fairness concerns irrelevant.  After citing Calder, 
the majority decision immediately declared that the judgments of the state court and the state’s 
political branches were legitimate, and explained that the Court had long ago abandoned a strict 
“used by the public” requirement in “public use” doctrine in favor of one that allows a taking for 
a public purpose.150  The Court’s focus shifted, in other words, from concern for the treatment of 
the particular property owner to a generalized, deferential analysis of the property’s ultimate, 
post-taking use.  Nor was the Court willing or able to consider any injustice in the compensation 
offered to the Kelo property owners (and to others whose property is taken for economic 
development)151—an issue that raises the question of whether economic development takings are 
144 Hawaii, 467 U.S. at 245.
145 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2661.
146 See id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 2676.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 2674-75.
150 Id. at 2661-63 (majority opinion).
151 See id. at 2668; id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The compensation issue was raised in one of the 
amicus curiae briefs presented to the Court in Kelo, see id. at 2668 n.21 (majority opinion), and, at oral argument, 
Justice Kennedy appeared interested in considering the compensation issue in economic development takings.  See
Transcript of Oral Argument at *15, Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2655 (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 529436.  But none of the 
Court’s found decisions, including Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, explicitly discussed it. 
Just compensation is also an issue in regulatory takings actions, in which compensation is also the 
constitutionally required remedy.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).  On the complexity of fixing compensation for so-called temporary takings in which 
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especially unfair, given the allegedly profitable uses to which the taken property will be put.152
Fairness in the abstract may well be one of the Court’s considerations when it reviews eminent 
domain actions under the Fifth Amendment, but the fairness principle is clearly overshadowed as 
a significant rationale by other concerns.  
The same holds true for the Court’s tendency to provide quick, relatively facile analyses 
of alleged regulatory injustices.  Modern regulatory takings decisions appear to oscillate in their 
fairness considerations:  when it finds that a regulatory taking has occurred, the Court tends to 
rely upon a narrow conception of fairness to the property owner and largely ignores the state’s 
interest in regulating a proposed use; but when it rejects a regulatory takings claim, the Court 
largely ignores any marginal unfairness that a property owner has suffered.153  Consider the 
restatements of regulatory takings substance and procedure offered in Lingle and San Remo.  
Lingle offers a logic in which property owners are likely to be compensated for a taking if the 
regulation’s effects fall within particular categories because the Court assumes that those types 
of effects represent per se unfairness—no matter the extent of the injustice and no matter the 
unfairness to others of allowing the property owner compensation.  If a regulatory action falls 
outside of those categories, however, the Court’s logic leaves property owners with little chance 
of winning—no matter the extent of the injustice they suffer and no matter the benefits that 
others receive from the regulation.  Again, as in Kelo, the Court’s other concerns supersede any 
worry the Court might have regarding the particular individualized unfairness that the property 
owner claims to have experienced.  
a government entity rescinds a regulatory act that has effected a taking, see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 23 at 
267-74.
152 Critics have argued that current enforcement of the Just Compensation Clause typically does not include 
the subjective premium over market value that a property owner would otherwise have demanded before selling, 
whatever surplus over market value the owner may have been able to negotiate as part of the sale (especially if the 
property that would be taken will be worth more as part of a larger land assemblage), and the loss of autonomy that a 
forced transfer imposes.  See Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original: Of Grubby Particulars & Grand 
Principles, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355, 359-61 (2005); Lee Ann Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 957, 962-67.  More specific, identifiable losses may also remain uncompensated, such as relocation 
expenses, replacement costs, and, for commercial landowners and lessees, the disruption to their business and the 
lost good will associated with their former location. See Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 7, at 83; 
Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 829, 890-92 (1989).  But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain
(Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 06-01, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875412 (collecting data on 
government’s tendency to overcompensate, especially through hefty relocation awards). Commentators have 
proposed various means to address this “uncompensated increment.”  See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Bargaining for Takings Compensation (Bar Ilan Univ. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 13-05, 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=806164 (advocating a scheme whereby property 
owners’ self-assessments of the property’s value would be factored into a compensation figure); Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 963-64 (2003) (imposing a 
heightened means-ends test on use of eminent domain power patterned after Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374, and Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 825); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 952, 1005-06 (1982) 
(advocating blunt imposition of market inalienability on some forms of property).
153 See Underkuffler, supra note 63, at 22-28.  As Underkuffler explains, the Court’s blindness to the relational 
quality of the justice issue in land use regulation was made easier by the facts of its decisions in the late 1980s and 
1990s (especially Lucas), in which the regulatory issues appeared technical and the property owner’s loss was great.  
But the three major substantive regulatory takings decisions of this century, Palazzolo, Tahoe-Sierra, and Lingle, 
featured either less sympathetic plaintiffs (such as Chevron) or striking public interests (large quantities of wetlands 
in Palazzolo and Lake Tahoe in Tahoe-Sierra).  See id. at 25-26.
23
The Court relied upon quite similar logic in upholding the procedural scheme under 
review in San Remo.  In a decision that reached the opposite conclusion from the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision that the Court upheld in San Remo, the Second Circuit characterized the effect of 
barring consideration of federal constitutional claims in federal court under the Full Faith and 
Credit Act as “unfair.”154 Although it did not expressly reject the assertion that this would be 
“unfair,” the Court’s series of responses—that neither the Constitution nor Congress has 
compelled access to federal court for federal constitutional claims, and that facial takings claims 
have no ripeness requirements and can therefore be filed initially in federal court—failed to 
consider the appearance of unfairness, especially for litigants convinced that their state court 
system undervalues and under-protects property rights.155  Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, by 
contrast, characterized the results of Williamson County’s ripeness requirements and the Full 
Faith and Credit Act as “dramatic,” especially when seen in comparison to First Amendment and 
equal protection challenges to local land use decisions, which face no ripeness requirements and 
can be litigated initially in federal court.  Thus, Justice Rehnquist and three other justices 
signaled their willingness to reconsider what they perceived to be an unfair system of 
adjudication.156  For the majority, however, logical systems of judicial review serve as proxies 
for fairness; the sense of fairness articulated so eloquently in the Armstrong principle itself plays 
little role in the workings of these systems.
2. Fairness in the Political Process: Protection Against Democratic Excess
A more precise understanding of fairness, and one that offers a somewhat more 
discernible approach to judicial review, attempts to identify when a failure in the political 
process has left an individual or an identifiable group victim to the “democratic excess” of a 
political majority.157 Compensation is due under the Takings Clause, in this view, when the 
government takes property from the politically vulnerable, or from an individual or a small group 
of people, and in so doing either violates its norm of providing compensation in similar 
circumstances or chooses which property to take based on the identity of the particular 
landowner.158  Precisely when, and on whose behalf, courts should intervene is a subject of 
significant debate among political process theorists—a debate which itself illustrates the theory’s 
relative indeterminacy.  One cannot tell in advance either which types of individuals or groups 
need greater protection, which levels (federal, state, or local) or branches (executive, legislative, 
or judicial) of government are most likely to fail to protect the politically vulnerable, or who in a 
particular instance was exploited because she was politically vulnerable.159
154 San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2504 (quoting Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Service, 342 
F.3d 118, 130 (2003)).
155 See id. at 2504-07.
156 See id. at 2509-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157 William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of 
Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 897 - 98 (1991).
158 See Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 306-08 (1992); 
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 782, 872 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor, The Original Understanding].
159 See James E. Krier, Takings from Freund to Fischel, 84 GEO. L.J. 1895, 1909-10 (1996) (reviewing 
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS  (1995) [hereinafter FISCHEL, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS]); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 Yale L.J. 1121, 1140-41 (1996) 
(reviewing FISCHEL, supra).
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Both the Armstrong and Calder v. Bull principles certainly focus on the relationship 
between the state’s treatment of the property owner and of others, and implicit in both is the 
concern that the property owner has suffered as a result of her unequal access to an unfair or 
undemocratic political process.  Indeed, Lingle’s summary of the doctrine’s logic explained that 
part of the Court’s concern in its categorical takings rules is to protect against the “unique 
burden” that particular types of regulatory effects impose upon their victims.160  The Court 
appeared to assume that when regulatory effects are dramatic—resulting in permanent physical 
invasions and total diminutions in property value—then the democratic process has unfairly 
treated the individuals by taking significant property rights from them.161 In other words, the 
Court appears to view its functional equivalence categories as a proxy for instances of political 
process failure.162
But in rejecting the Agins test, Lingle demonstrated that the Court’s focus is not on 
checking, or even considering, the specific political process that results in particular regulatory
action, but is instead on the actual effects of the regulatory action itself.163  What the government 
did and how and why the government did it are not the key questions that courts are to ask of 
regulations challenged under the Takings Clause.  Rather, as Lingle made clear, courts should 
consider only the impact the government’s actions have had on the property owner.  Clear, actual 
failures in the political process are more appropriately considered under the Equal Protection 
Clause, where evidence of the process by which individuals are excluded and singled out is far 
more relevant,164 while irrational regulatory actions are considered under a substantive due 
process analysis.165  The process itself is not the subject of takings claims.
Furthermore, the “functional equivalence” to confiscation that Lingle made plain is the 
“common touchstone” of regulatory takings doctrine is both over- and under-inclusive as a proxy 
for political process failure.166  Not all total diminutions in value, for example, fall on the 
politically vulnerable and voiceless—as the Lucas decision, which concerned regulation that 
affected expensive beachfront property owners and a plaintiff who had been a successful land 
developer, illustrates.167 Indeed, the Court’s rendering of the facts in its Nollan, Dolan, and 
Loretto decisions, which concerned plaintiffs who owned beachfront property168 and property 
160 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2082.
161 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (“Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no 
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that 
the legislature is simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life in a manner that secures an average 
reciprocity of advantage to everyone concerned.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
162 See Farber, supra note 158, at 303-05.
163 See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2084 (rejecting Agins substantial advancement test because it “reveals nothing 
about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights . . . [or] 
about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners”).
164 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 23 at 156-57.
165 See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2083-84.
166 Id. at 2082.
167 See Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote Efficient Regulation?, 
in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 224-28, 250-51 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
168 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
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used for commercial gain,169 do not classify the plaintiffs as members of the Takings Clause 
version of discrete, insular minorities.170  Although the Court never identified a particularly 
egregious process failure in local political institutions, it established rules in each decision that 
virtually assured that the plaintiffs would win a judgment awarding compensation. 
Political process theory also fails to capture the results in cases that fall outside the 
narrow categories of heightened scrutiny, where plaintiffs usually lose.  These decisions rarely 
consider whether the property owners have suffered from significant frustrations with the 
political process or were singled out for a special burden.  Why has the political process failed 
when an owner loses the full value of her home, even if she is wealthy and powerful enough to 
seek political voice in the state and local democratic process, but not when she loses, say, 95% of 
the value or some other percentage that approaches, but does not meet, the 100% threshold?171
Even more clearly, political process theory cannot explain Kelo or San Remo.  The Court 
demonstrated no more than a cursory concern with the administrative process that led to New 
London’s decision to exercise its eminent domain authority over the Kelo plaintiffs’ property; as 
a result, the majority concluded that the economic development plan’s careful formulation 
deserved deference.172 That the formulation was careful may speak to the needs for economic 
development and the rationality of the plan itself, but it ignores whether the affected 
homeowners were singled out or lacked sufficient voice to participate in that formulation.  And if 
the Court was truly concerned about the possibility of local and state institutions exploiting 
individual property owners, then it would surely allow regulatory takings plaintiffs to preserve 
their federal constitutional claims for federal courts—a step the Court refused to take in San 
Remo. 
3. Fairness in the Vernacular: Social Norms as a Constitutional Baseline
While the Court repeatedly finds an abstract call for fairness in the Fifth Amendment and 
has expressed it in the generalities of the compensation requirement and the Armstrong and 
Calder v. Bull principles, it has failed to provide any precise limiting factor or test.  But doctrine 
does not exhaust the relationship between property and fairness in the vernacular expression of 
property rights by non-lawyers, as the popular response to Kelo demonstrates.  The largely 
inchoate public distaste for a Constitution that would allow a city to take someone’s property for 
economic development is a popular, as opposed to doctrinal or theoretical, understanding of 
constitutional rights, or what Bruce Ackerman famously called an “ordinary observer’s” 
understanding of widely held social expectations and disputed legal rules.173  This non-technical, 
169 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379 (plaintiff was a hardware store owner); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (plaintiff owner was the owner-landlord of a residential apartment building 
in Manhattan).
170 The focus on “discrete, insular minorities” emanates, of course, from Justice Stone’s famous footnote in 
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and was extended to a broader constitutional 
jurisprudence in John Hart Ely’s DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-77 (1980).  The 
takings version of political process theory traces its history from these texts.  See Treanor, The Original 
Understanding, supra note 158, at 872-73.
171 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 
271 (2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the very high threshold required to meet diminution of 
value test for takings).
172 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2664-65.
173 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (1977).
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non-textual vision of fairness offers a set of possible constitutional baselines that would fill in the 
gaps the Court has left in its open-ended, venerable fairness principles. 
 This baseline arises out of what Carol Rose has identified as the norms and narration that 
underlie ordinary conceptions of ownership.174  In vernacular expressions of ownership, property 
is more than simply a relationship with the thing that is owned, or a relationship with others in 
relation to the owned thing—it is also experienced and understood as a narrative, and part of a 
broader narrative of the self and its relationship to a broader community.175 When property is 
confiscated by the state, or its value is diminished by state action, the property owner’s claims 
naturally slip into a narrative structure, one that often features an amorphous but compelling 
claim that the state has violated her constitutional property rights.  Consider, for example, the 
following tales:  
I purchased this coastal property with the intent to build my beachfront dream house, and 
now the state won’t let me build anything and the property is worthless.176
This house has been in my family for over 100 years; I was born here, as were my 
children; my son lives next door with his family in a house that he received as a wedding 
gift; and now the city wants to take my family’s houses and give them to a large 
corporation which will tear them down.177
Innocent of wrongdoing, surprised by a heartless government’s action, and threatened with the 
loss of cherished property, the owner appears as an exceptionally sympathetic victim whose 
woeful tale creates a sense of demoralization in those who hear it.178  No one’s property is safe 
when one person’s property is taken in a way that violates the norms of government behavior.  
These are powerful, persuasive narratives, and takings plaintiffs’ attorneys and property rights 
activists have utilized the ability of the well-told takings story to advance their legal and political 
cause.179
174 See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION 5-6 (1994).  My use of “scientific” in this context comes 
from Ackerman’s notion of the “scientific policymaker,” whose vision is opposed to the ordinary observer.  See
ACKERMAN, supra note 173, at 11, 15.
175 See generally Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 51 (1990) (hypothesizing a series of characters whose order of 
preferences in the distribution and use of property illustrates the various ways individuals tell property stories).  In 
the words of the editors of a recent collection of essays telling the story behind numerous canonical property 
decisions, “our regime of property law emerges and evolves” out of the narrative conflicts described in “property 
stories.”  Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss, Introduction, in PROPERTY STORIES 1, 2 (Gerald Korngold & 
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
176 This is a stylized version of the facts in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-09.
177 This is a stylized version of the facts in Wilhelmina Dery’s claim as it is described in Justice O’Connor’s 
Kelo dissent.  See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2671.
178 See William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle: The Narratives of Takings, and Compensation 
Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1161 (1997) [hereinafter Treanor, The Armstrong Principle].  Frank 
Michelman originally identified the costs resulting from the “demoralization” experienced by property owners, their 
sympathizers, and other observers following an especially painful uncompensated loss from regulation.  See
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 137, at 1214.
179 See Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered 
Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 441, 443-47 (2004); Treanor, The Armstrong
Principle, supra note 168, at 1158-70; Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative 
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Common to these narratives is the implicit outrage at the idea that an individual who 
owns property and makes normal use of it can have her ownership and future expectations 
disrupted by an unforeseen regulatory or eminent domain action.  A baseline of constitutional 
rights from the ordinary observer’s perspective must therefore protect an owner’s expectations in 
both her affective investment in a narrative of ownership and use, and in her financial investment 
in the fungible value of her property.180  This baseline would also require that the owner’s use of 
her property be consistent with the norms of community behavior and would not cause harm to 
others.  Her property may only be subject to confiscation if the community’s needs are great and 
the community has no other alternative but to take the owner’s land.181  A vernacular fairness 
rule, then, would protect an owner’s normal expected use of her land if it is reasonably similar to 
and congruent with the uses to which fellow community members put their land.182
But the Court has not adopted either an ordinary observer’s perspective or a community 
norm baseline as a general approach to takings.  In Tahoe-Sierra, for example, the majority 
explicitly rejected the dissent’s effort to consider a temporary moratorium from the landowner’s 
point of view, asserting that such a perspective would find every restriction on use to be a taking 
for which compensation is due.183 The narrow regulatory takings categories do appear to 
consider both the perspective and the baseline: the physical invasion and the total diminution in 
value tests certainly have the value of simplicity, and the decisions that established each test 
dwell on the extent and severity of the regulatory effect owners experience in relation to other 
property owners.184 As Lingle declared, however, these categories are quite narrow; and outside 
Backlash Against Environmentalists, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 637, 641-46 (1995).  An especially influential 
example of the pro-property owner takings narrative, which Justice Thomas cited in his Kelo dissent, was a report 
issued in 2003 by the Institute for Justice collecting numerous instances of allegedly unconstitutional eminent 
domain actions.  See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN (2003), available at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/report/; see also Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2676 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing BERLINER, 
supra).
180 This is how Laura Underkuffler summarizes the “common conception” of property rights and takings. See
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 45 (2002).
181 See Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 NOMOS 223, 239-40 (1994).
182 See, e.g., FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 149, at 352-61; Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban 
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to 
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729-33 (1973); John 
E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
183 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324 n.19 (responding to id. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
184 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 234-35 
(1990). Loretto, for example, specifically characterized the physical invasion as the “special kind of injury” an 
owner suffers from a stranger’s presence on her land. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-46.  Similarly, Lucas explicitly 
adopted the landowner’s point of view in analogizing a total diminution to a physical appropriation. See Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1017-18.  Lucas also appeared to adopt a community norm baseline, referring to the “understandings of our 
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they 
obtain title to property.” Id. at 1027. Although owners may reasonably expect occasional restrictions on the uses 
they make of their land, the Court asserted “our constitutional culture” protects against a regulation that extends so 
far as to erase all economically viable uses of land. Id. at 1028.
The Court’s exactions decisions similarly turn, at least in part, on the physical invasion created by the 
requirement that property owners dedicate an easement as a condition for a government agency’s discretionary 
development approval.  See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; see also FISCHEL, REGULATORY 
TAKINGS, supra note 149, at 58 (arguing that the Nollan decision, which required compensation for a condition on 
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of them, the perspective of the ordinary owner or observer and a community norm baseline 
appear to be irrelevant.  Only an actual permanent invasion, or a total diminution in value and 
use, or a condition on development that requires the dedication of land, enjoy the stringent 
protection provided by what appears to be the conception of vernacular fairness incorporated 
within the relevant category.  Whereas an ordinary observer would likely see a 90% diminution 
as warranting compensation as a rule, the Court does not.185  Thus Lingle’s restatement of the 
Court’s regulatory takings doctrine, with its default balancing test and exceptional, categorical 
rules, seems to be the product not of the ordinary observer but of what Ackerman called the 
“scientific policymaker” who “manipulates technical legal concepts” to illuminate the 
relationship between legal rules and a self-consistent set of larger principles.186
Kelo similarly rejected a popular, community-norm-based conception.  Justice O’Connor 
began her dissent in Kelo by telling the story of the displaced property owners from their 
perspective.  She also emphasized that the Kelo plaintiffs did not use their property in such a way 
that it caused harm to others, unlike the blighted property in Berman and the oligopolistic land 
trusts in Midkiff.187  The majority, by contrast, began its narrative of the facts by focusing on the 
conditions of New London and on the city’s decision-making process,188 and by asserting that 
the condition of the plaintiffs’ property was irrelevant in the face of precedent, as well as the 
judgments of state and local legislators and the state supreme court.189
Perhaps the Court’s mere invocation of a vernacular fairness is a recognition that 
ordinary observation could not help formulate a workable federal constitutional test, and an 
acknowledgement that this perspective begs as many questions as it resolves.  Whose fairness 
would be at stake if a Court accepts on its face, and attempts to apply, an ordinary observer’s 
sense of fairness?  Whose narrative counts—the property owner’s claim that her property has 
been unfairly taken, or claims brought by neighbors and the general public alleging that the 
property owner’s expectations should not have included protection against regulation or a 
necessary eminent domain action?  The claims of both owner and community proliferate in a 
regulatory state where local, state, and federal authorities react to real and perceived 
environmental and social impacts from land use, and where courts serve as a final means for an 
individual property owner to challenge majoritarian decisions.  And these claims or narratives 
themselves produce a proliferation of counter-claims and -narratives from government officials 
and other members of the community who both assert the need for regulation and condemn the 
property owner’s present or proposed use of her land.  Providing compensation to property 
owners who consider themselves unfairly treated will not resolve the conflicts in competing 
development where the property owner merely sought to build a house that would be consistent with “normal” 
California beachfront housing, applied a community norm baseline).
185 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8; NEDELSKY, supra note 174, at 321 n.82.
186 ACKERMAN, supra note 173, at 11, 15.  As I have argued elsewhere with respect to the Court’s exactions 
decisions, the Court’s efforts to provide, at the margins, an ordinary observer’s conception of property when owners 
suffer the functional equivalent of confiscation, have resulted in the legal tests and administrative rules of the 
scientific policymaker.  See Fenster, supra note 135, at 648 (noting this irony at work in the Court’s exactions 
jurisprudence).
187 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2671, 2674-75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
188 See id. at 2658-59 (majority opinion).
189 See id. at 2664-65 & n.16.  Such opposing renditions of a case’s facts are fairly common in disputed 
takings decisions. See Alexander, supra note 129.  
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vernacular accounts of unfairness.  Fairness, in either its doctrinal or vernacular form, has not 
provided, and indeed may be unable to provide, a stable and coherent approach to takings.
B. Utilitarian Rationales
Utilitarian rationales for the Takings Clause consider how judicial enforcement of the 
Fifth Amendment can produce the private property regime that will best meet the proponent’s 
stated or unstated normative assumptions regarding how to maximize a society’s wealth.190
Libertarian utilitarians view a compensation requirement for regulation and limitations on 
eminent domain as means to limit inefficient government interference in the optimal private 
ordering of land use and ownership;191 others utilize constitutional limits to tease out optimal 
means to check, rather than debilitate, local government.192  Whether deeply skeptical or agnostic 
about government’s role, however, all utilitarians view the Takings Clause as an instrument of 
governance, a means by which the political decisions of regulators and agencies that wield 
eminent domain authority can be externally controlled by judicial review.
A common assumption among utilitarians who view the Takings Clause as a significant 
tool for wealth creation holds that strong, strictly enforced property rights both clarify and secure 
ownership and the extent of property’s allowed use, and thereby induce labor and investment.193
Utilitarian rationales rely on political economic theories of government behavior to identify the 
structural defects of state decision-making and operations that cause ineffective regulations and 
excessive exercises of eminent domain authority.  Police power authority, for example, provides 
government with strong incentives to avoid taking title to property and compensating the owner.  
Because a government agency can thereby shift regulatory costs onto property owners, a rational 
agency would never choose to take land and incur the constitutionally-required payment of 
compensation.  Government experiences the “fiscal illusion” that its regulations are inexpensive 
because property owners, rather than the state, bear the regulatory costs.194  Thus, government 
would always choose to regulate rather than use its eminent domain power when it can substitute 
regulation for outright takings, no matter if the taking would result in a “better,” more wealth 
maximizing outcome than the regulation.195 In order to act efficiently, the government agency 
must fully internalize the costs of regulation through the “price” of compensation paid to 
190 Bentham provides the classic utilitarian approach to property rights.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of 
the Civil Code, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-14 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931).
191 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2094-96 (1997) (arguing 
that a stable property rights system that limits to a small category those instances in which the state may take or 
regulate property will maximize wealth).
192 See, e.g. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 137, at 1214-18 (explicating system by 
which a compensation requirement can best meet utilitarian ethics by identifying, calibrating, and offsetting 
efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and settlement costs).
193 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-34 (6th ed. 2003); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Emily Sherwin, Three Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause 
Moral Anxiety 4-5 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-001, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=875634.
194 See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. 
L. REV. 569, 620-22 (1984).
195 This result would occur if the proposed regulatory scheme reduces private property values by more than the 
public money saved from avoiding compensation.  See William A. Fischel, Takings and Public Choice: The 
Persuasion of Price, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2003).
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property owners.  For utilitarians, the Fifth Amendment’s compensation requirement solves the 
fiscal illusion problem by forcing government to consider fully the impact of its decisions.196
Of course, merely finding a rationale for a compensation requirement does not identify 
precisely when and to what extent the requirement should be enforced against regulations.  To 
address this problem, utilitarian commentators have offered various tests to sniff out inefficient 
government interventions into market activity and with an eye to imposing rules that would 
result in more effective and fairly administered regulatory programs that better protect property 
rights and encourage the best usage of land.197
The same political economic dynamic that leads government to over-regulate and that 
therefore requires a limiting constitutional compensation requirement, utilitarians argue, also 
leads government agencies to misuse or abuse their eminent domain authority and requires 
analogous constitutional limits.  If frustrated by economic development within their jurisdiction 
or otherwise motivated to change existing patterns of land ownership and use, local officials can 
too quickly and cheaply take land and as a result will tend to do so excessively and frequently for 
the benefit of favored or powerful interests.  Judicial enforcement of the “public use” and “just 
compensation” clauses can serve as external checks that force such takings to be productive and 
wealth-enhancing.198  Strict limits on the public use of land would limit the objectives of eminent 
domain actions to the creation of public goods that are insufficiently supplied in the 
marketplace,199 or, in a less restrictive view, to instances in which the benefits of the taking 
outweigh the costs.200  In addition, a constitutional requirement that would correctly calibrate the 
just compensation owed to property owners would force government to disgorge excess gains 
from “naked transfers” of property from one party to another, and to increase compensation to 
former owners for their loss of implicit, in-kind benefits of the property they lose.201  A correctly 
196 See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(compensation requirement forces government to internalize the costs of its regulatory acts); EPSTEIN, supra note 5, 
at 214-15, 263-73; POSNER, supra note 183, at 58; William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and 
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269-70 
(1988).
197 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 537-38, 
606-08 (2005) (proposing an integrated theory of property based on the assertion that law should create and defend 
the value of stable ownership in order to enable owners extract maximum utility from their possessions, and arguing 
that an “undue diminution of value” test for regulatory takings would be consistent with their theory and further its 
goals); Lawrence Blume & Daniel J. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. 
REV. 569, 624 (1984) (advocating “risk-insurance approach to the taking question” that can improve efficiency of 
the land market by compensating large risks of regulation); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 
137, at 1222-23 (1967) (proposing rough formulation of when compensation should be paid based upon benefits and 
costs of regulation, settlement costs, and demoralization costs); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory 
Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 750 (1994) (proposing ex ante and ex post 
tests to check if pre-regulatory land use was efficient and if post-regulatory efficiency has been achieved).
198 Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, supra note 7, at 82-87. 
199 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 166-69.
200 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 137, at 1241.
201 Bell & Parchomovsky, surpa note 152 (proposing that property owners self-assess value of their home, and 
the government can only take the property at that price; but if the government decides not to take the property, the 
property cannot be sold for less than the self-assessment for seventy years without payment of the shortfall to the 
government, and the self-assessed price is factored into property tax liability); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, 
Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 865-73.  On the use of compensation as a means to achieve substantive 
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calibrated compensation scheme, therefore, would curb government overreach while it would 
more fully compensate owners of taken property.
For some utilitarians, these constitutional restrictions and their enforcement must be quite 
strict.  Those who find governmental overreach abuse to be the norm—rather than the 
occasional, correctable result of structural defects in regulatory and taking authority—view 
municipal efforts to control land use and ownership merely as opportunities for self-interested 
officials and rent-seeking interest groups to use regulatory authority for private gain.202
Democratic politics provide neither sufficient internal constraints on the scope of regulation and 
eminent domain actions nor external political constraints on elected leaders.  As a result, land use 
controls create opportunities for significant corruption and abuse.203  From this perspective, even 
correctly calibrated compensation cannot curb both the authority of government agencies to take 
land on behalf of a favored interest and the willingness and ability of favored interests and 
officials to utilize that authority.204  Only a vigorously enforced public use clause that would 
invalidate any taking that did not result in publicly accessible land can serve as an effective 
external check on abuse of government authority.205  Similarly, because regulation serves merely 
as a means by which rent-seeking private interests and self-motivated officials feather their own 
nests, the judiciary must apply the regulatory takings doctrine broadly and enforce it strictly as 
an external check on inevitable government overreach.206
The Court’s takings decisions have not entirely ignored utilitarian and public choice 
considerations and skepticism about the wealth-enhancing effects of government action.  Justice 
Holmes began the modern era of regulatory takings by expressing the intuitive public choice 
notion that “the natural tendency of human nature” is to extend collective authority; a 
constitutional check on regulations that extend “too far,” therefore, operates to preserve the right 
of private property and all of its attendant benefits.207  In a more recent decision, Justice Scalia 
similarly hypothesized that, absent a constitutional limit, government agencies would leverage 
their police powers to achieve unstated, unrelated, and even illegitimate goals through 
regulation—which would lead, presumably, to excessive regulation that fails to perform the 
regulatory purpose of reducing the harms created by a proposed land use.208
But Justice Holmes’s intuitive version of public choice theory does not represent either a 
necessary constitutional logic or a norm of judicial reasoning, as the Court has in fact rarely cited 
goals, see Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 677 (2005).
202 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 104; Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 
Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. L. REV. 1005, 1021-23 (2004) 
[hereinafter Somin, Overcoming Poletown].  
203 See Somin, Overcoming Poletown, supra note 203, at 1011-16. 
204 See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, ms. at 32-36 
(George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-01, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874865.
205 See id. at 5-7.
206 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 100-04.
207 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
208 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5 (establishing the “essential nexus” test for conditions placed on 
development in part because, absent a constitutional limit, government agencies would leverage their police power 
to achieve goals that are unrelated to legitimate land use purposes). 
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utilitarian concerns as a significant ground for enforcing constitutional property rights 
protections.  Indeed, when the Court has considered the consequences of a compensation 
requirement on a regulation or of a substantive limit on an eminent domain action, it has 
frequently decided that Takings Clause enforcement is unrelated to, or even opposed to, an 
optimal utilitarian end.  Thus, in recent years the Court has held that some regulatory activity and 
economic development projects can be wealth-enhancing and necessary for the management of 
scarce resources—while at the same time curbing regulatory and taking authority through 
constitutional enforcement would limit the state’s ability to help increase societal wealth.209  The 
Court has hypothesized that stricter enforcement of the Takings Clause may skew governmental 
actions and produce suboptimal results by creating incentives for agencies to make decisions in 
order to avoid judicial scrutiny rather than basing decisions on the wisest course of action 
available to them.210  In other words, the Court has decided that judicial conceptions of a 
utilitarian purpose in land use controls are irrelevant, except where the judiciary is considering 
the costs of heightened scrutiny to its own administrative utility;211 the wisest, most utilitarian 
course of judicial action is to defer to governmental conclusions regarding the utilitarian value of 
its own regulatory or eminent domain actions. 
It is unclear why the Court has largely eschewed the legal academy’s fascination with, 
and development of, a utilitarian analysis of the Takings Clause.  The Court may have 
determined that a utilitarian approach is too indeterminate to adopt, given the persuasive 
arguments that can be harnessed on behalf of and against the utility of government interventions 
209 On the potential wealth-enhancing effects of economic development takings, see Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2662-
63 nn.7, 8; on the wealth-enhancing effects of land use regulations, see Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 339-41 
(characterizing a deliberative, careful approach to regional planning that imposes a temporary moratorium on 
development during the planning process as an important means to avoid “inefficient and ill-conceived growth” and 
is likely to increase property values throughout the affected region).  The state frequently must step in to manage the 
use of scarce public goods such as clean air, water, park space, and road capacity where the existing distribution of 
entitlements to use those resources block beneficial contractual arrangements.  See GARY D. LIBECAP, 
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 115-21 (1989).  There is a significant literature on the necessity of land use 
regulations to respond to resource depletion and congestion and on the need to limit a compensation requirement to 
allow government to shape market activity to manage transitions.  See Poirier, supra note 6, at 179-83; Carol M. 
Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 18 (2000).  In 
addition, land use regulation has proven to have both wealth-enhancing effects and popularity among rational 
homeowners who believe, correctly, that land use controls often raise and protect property values. See McUsic supra
note 5, at 625 n.162; WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 51-52 (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, 
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS].
210 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (rejecting a rule that would compensate for 
every delay because it “would encourage hasty decision-making”); see also Fenster, supra note 135, at 652-58 
(identifying the range of consequences, most of them unintended and suboptimal, stemming from the Court’s efforts 
to increase scrutiny of land use exactions); Krier & Serkin, supra note 201, at 864-65 (noting the problems that 
would arise from greater scrutiny of eminent domain actions under public use clause); Michael H. Schill, 
Regulations and Housing Development: What We Know, 8 CITYSCAPE 5, 6-8 (2005) (cautioning that efforts to 
remove land use regulation find it difficult to distinguish “bad” from “good” regulations).
211 The Court has cited the potentially catastrophic transactional costs associated with resolving or settling 
regulatory takings claims, as well as the decisional costs to the judiciary of administering stricter limits on the public 
use clause. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (rejecting a rule that would compensate for every delay because it 
“would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive”); Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2662 (expressing concern 
about the difficulty of heightened judicial review under the public use clause).
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into market activity.212  A court could follow Richard Epstein and conclude that only an 
expansive regulatory takings doctrine and a narrow public use clause can adequately maximize 
wealth; or it could follow Carol Rose and conclude that the best wealth-maximizing approach to 
takings would be to form a doctrinal compromise in which regulation proceeds flexibly and 
cautiously, and only those whose investment-backed expectations are severely frustrated receive 
compensation;213 or it could recognize that any effort to maximize the utility of constitutional 
limits on land use controls requires a multi-dimensional analysis that considers an almost 
unlimited range of concerns, from “takings” to “givings,” and from the effects of compensation 
requirements on the public and on indirectly affected property owners.214  Neither text nor 
history nor precedent dictates a choice between those two options.  Perhaps, too, the Court has 
recognized the validity of critiques of utilitarian approaches,215 or the inadequately theorized 
concepts on which utilitarians rely to promote vigorous takings enforcement, such as the fiscal 
illusion of regulation and the cost internalization effect of compensation requirements.216  It is 
also possible that the utilitarian approach is not as distinct from others as it might superficially 
appear, and that an approach emphasizing fairness and one that emphasizes a utilitarian ethic will 
frequently turn on similar considerations and measures, as Frank Michelman argued more than a 
generation ago.217  Viewed this way, the court has not rejected utilitarianism but merely 
incorporates its insights within other rationales.  But significantly, the court did not rely upon a 
utilitarian rationale as a basis for its 2005 decisions.
C. Private Property as an Institution
212 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 134 (2004) (noting economic 
arguments both for and against providing compensation for regulatory takings); DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 
27-32 (noting utilitarian arguments in favor of eminent domain authority, as well as reasons for limiting that 
authority).
213 See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation:  Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. 
REV. 1, 19-21.
214 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (identifying the underutilization by the public of rare and valuable resources due to 
excessive constitutional rights that over-protect property); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 
YALE L.J. 547 (2001) (identifying “givings,” in which a government promulgates a regulation that grants benefits to, 
rather than confiscates the property of, an identifiable individual or individuals); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (2001) (identifying the “derivative taking” that 
results from the reduction in the value of property near a parcel that is taken by regulation or eminent domain).
215 For example, a moral hazard problem would arise from an expanded compensation requirement, which will 
encourage owners to overdevelop and over-invest in their property with the knowledge that any regulatory act that 
addresses an owner’s use of her land will be compensated.  See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 614-17 (1986).  Commentators have devised solutions to this moral hazard.  See
Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 48 (2003) (proposing a compensation 
scheme that would bar recovery for a property owner’s reckless overdevelopment); Lawrence Blume et al., The 
Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71, 88 (1984) (proposing that compensation 
only be paid for amount approximating full value of property without overdevelopment).
216 See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Public Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
245, 289 (2002) (summarizing empirical evidence and theoretical arguments against assumptions embedded in fiscal 
illusion concept); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 387 (2000) (arguing that cost internalization theory of compensation 
requirement fails because the incentive effects of constitutional cost remedies are “simply indeterminate,” and is 
likely to be as perverse as beneficial).
217 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 137, at 1225-26.
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A final general justification for enforcement of the Takings Clause holds that 
constitutional compensation and public use requirements are necessary to protect property rights 
as an essential institution for the maintenance of natural law and of social order and community.  
Since its earliest modern occurrence in Mahon, for example, the Court’s regulatory takings 
doctrine has frequently warned that, if the state is allowed to extend its police powers too far, use 
of these powers will expand “until at last private property disappears.”218 This justification is not 
primarily utilitarian insofar as it posits that property’s institutional value transcends any 
particular wealth-enhancing effects; nor is it primarily intended to remedy any particularized 
unfairness to an individual owner.  Rather, this rationale, which includes quite distinct 
approaches, views the institution of private property as holding significant value for human 
dignity and the creation of a good society. 
1. Property as Natural Right/ Takings Clause as Protective Shield
Natural law (or natural rights) proponents argue that property serves as a pre-legal and 
pre-political right that remains inherent in personhood under civil society’s social compact 
between the individual and the state.219  Whether viewed as flowing from a Creator or as 
developed in human experience and through common law rights, the institution of private 
property protects from coercive state action the things over which an individual claims dominion 
and for which she expended her labor.  Thus, natural rights proponents argue, in order to protect 
private property from the inevitable vulnerability that comes with government authority to 
redistribute entitlements, courts must interpret the Takings Clause strictly and enforce it 
broadly.220  Specifically, courts must award compensation to property owners for the regulatory 
prohibition of non-nuisance harms,221 and courts must interpret government’s authority to take 
under the public use clause narrowly, and invalidating all eminent domain actions whose end 
result will be a private use of the taken land except in narrow, historically recognized 
218 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.  A taking of particularly important strands of the bundle of 
property rights also requires compensation under the same logic because to allow otherwise would challenge an 
essential historical institution.  See, e.g., Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716 (the right to pass valuable property to one’s heirs is 
an essential right of property).
219 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 9-10; Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1566-68 (2003).
220 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
877, 892-901 (2004) [hereinafter Claeys, Public-Use Limitations] (arguing that narrow “public use” limitation for 
eminent domain actions was an essential assumption of natural rights theory’s conception of property); Richard A. 
Epstein, Ruminations on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: An Introduction to Amicus Curiae Brief, 25 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Ruminations] (defining ownership as “a set of complete and 
well defined rights over the property,” and arguing that any deprivation of “one of the indispensable attributes of 
ownership” requires compensation); Douglas Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 995-96 (1997) (condemning the “‘ad hocly’-edged” [sic] Penn Central for an “overly 
deferential standard of review” and “virtually insurmountable presumption of constitutionality” that “is against a 
presumption against freedom of ownership”) [hereinafter Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces]; cf. Ellen 
Frankel Paul, Moral Restraints and Eminent Domain, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 153 (1986) (reviewing EPSTEIN,
supra note 5) (rejecting eminent domain, “however circumscribed,” as a legitimate form of state power because of 
its threat to private property rights).
221 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 57-92, 112-21; Douglas Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces, supra 
note 220, at 1044-46 (1997).
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categories.222  And in order to secure a natural rights conception of private property, courts must 
adopt stable, precise, and self-enforcing rules.223
But as Carol Rose has noted, natural law conceptions of a pre-political basis for property 
rights have never had more than a “frail” hold on takings jurisprudence.224  The Court has 
occasionally feinted in the direction of natural rights in its decisions establishing per se 
categories of takings, boldly pronouncing that compensation is required for a particular type of 
regulatory effect or for the taking of a particularly significant stick in the bundle of property 
rights.225  But to understand property rights as a bundle rather than as a coherent whole, and to 
reward some regulatory effects with compensation while allowing other significant effects 
without rule-bound, formal protection, is to adopt something that falls significantly short of a 
natural law approach.226  The unanimous reiteration of this approach in Lingle further 
demonstrated that the Court has rejected a unitary, natural law theory of property in favor of a 
theory of property as a disentangled bunch of severable rights. This is not natural law, and 
natural rights proponents are the first to admit that even at the heights of the Rehnquist Court’s 
apparent expansion of regulatory takings, the Supreme Court did not adopt their view.227  Indeed, 
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo, which expressly adopted a natural law approach to property, 
failed to garner a single additional justice.228 And although Justice O’Connor included in her 
Kelo dissent an ironic reversal of Marx’s opening to The Communist Manifesto—warning that 
“the specter of condemnation hangs over all property” as a result of the majority’s decision229—
she would allow a much broader array of takings than Justice Thomas.230
222 See Claeys, Public-Use Limitations, supra note 220, at 928.
223 See McUsic, McUsic supra note 5, at 660-61 (associating natural rights approach with rule formalism).  
Not all natural rights proponents are equally rule-bound and formalistic, however.  Compare EPSTEIN, supra note 5, 
at 36 (positing a “simple test” for compensation: “Would the government action be treated as a taking of private 
property if it had been performed by some private party?”) with Douglas W. Kmeic, The Original Understanding of 
the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1665-66 (1988) (arguing in favor of a 
“delicate and dynamic balance” between individual rights and majoritarian governance that restores a strong 
nuisance limitation on regulations and broadens government liability for compensation).
224 Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 
595 (1984).
225 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (“[T]otal deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of 
view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation”); Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-17 (the right to devise property to one’s 
heirs “has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times” and a total abrogation of that right 
requires compensation); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (because it abrogates the right to exclude, a permanent physical 
invasion necessarily effects a taking “without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or 
has only minimal economic impact on the owner”); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (the 
right to exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property” and a regulation that imposes a navigational servitude on a marina owner thereby destroys the right to 
exclude and requires compensation). 
226 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 20-26 (criticizing Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in XXII 
NOMOS: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980), for characterizing the disintegration of 
property).
227 See Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187 (2004); 
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1369, 1392 (1993).
228 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Public Use Clause, in short, embodied the 
Framers' understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right. . . .”).
229 Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
230 See id. at 2674 (reaffirming, though limiting, Berman and Midkiff).
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This may well be the fault of the theory, not the Court.  Any effort to limit non-
compensable takings to the regulation of nuisance-like harms must not only rely upon a 
significantly heightened judicial scrutiny of regulatory and takings decisions, it must also 
confront the difficult line-drawing issue created by the need to identify the boundaries of 
nuisance and public use.231  The natural rights advocate must assert that some line-drawing 
principle emerges from the Constitution itself—a principle so clear and strong that it trumps 
states’ authority to utilize their police powers and to define the limits of property rights within 
their jurisdiction.232 In Lucas, Justice Scalia himself conceded the impossibility of engaging in a 
principled line-drawing exercise between regulations that prevent harm, and thus do not require 
compensation, and those that confer benefits on others, which do.233  Once one recognizes the 
difficulty of line-drawing, property’s occasional tendency towards crystalline rules234 becomes 
impossible to extend fully to the Takings Clause—whose enforcement, if considered as a means 
to limit non-nuisance based regulation, would inevitably require courts to make difficult 
judgments regarding contested land uses on the basis of conditions and norms that change across 
time and space.235
2. Property as Social and Political Institution/ Takings Clause as Mediating 
Device
An approach that emphasizes property’s social nature and collective values foregrounds 
the relationships that ownership creates and expresses.  This approach emphasizes the sense of 
responsibility and obligations an owner has to others and to the property she owns, as well as the 
mutual trust that a property regime is intended to foster among members of society.236  In 
addition to defining the terms ownership and use, the rules of property law establish both the 
individual’s place in society and her obligations “to respect the legitimate interests of others in 
controlling certain portions of the physical world.”237 Property serves as a foundation of decency, 
propriety, and good order.  Accordingly, a constitutional property right must operate reciprocally 
both to protect an individual’s ownership entitlements and to redistribute those entitlements 
when propriety or the community requires it.238
231 See Stewart Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to 
Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231, 235-36 (2004) [hereinafter Sterk, Inevitable Failure]; Glynn S. Lunney, 
Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 433, 
435 (1995).
232 See Sterk, Inevitable Failure, supra note 231, at 236-39.
233 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025-26.
234 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 9-24 (2000); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 577 (1988); Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1086-88 
(1997).  Even crystalline rules and institutions of ownership (such as the fee simple, common ownership, publicly 
held corporations, and the like) change over time. See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 
1558-65 (2003).
235 Sherwin,  supra note 234, at 6-8.
236 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUDIES 1, 13 (1993)
237 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 134 (2000).
238 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997); Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 
NOMOS 223, 239-40 (1994); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 
(1981).
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According to Joseph Singer, the Court has adopted at least a version of this approach in 
its 2005 takings decisions.239  The Court, he argues, enforces constitutional rights by balancing a 
property-rule right that views ownership as paramount and the home as a “castle,” against a 
liability-rule right in which ownership entitles an individual only to full compensation for her 
investment-backed expectations when the government takes her property for public needs.240
This balance produces a “citizenship model” of property rights in which owners’ rights to use, 
protect, and profit from their home are limited by their obligations, for the good of the 
community to which they belong, both to restrain themselves and, at times, to act 
affirmatively.241  Thus, the map of regulatory takings claims that Lingle set out recognizes 
property as a “castle” when it is besieged by extreme regulatory effects, but otherwise subjects 
owners’ expectations “to the crucible of human judgment to determine their reasonableness.”242
This social view of property embraces precisely what natural law proponents fear as an 
excess of state intervention into the inherent rights of ownership—the political, community-
based nature of decisions over how land is to be used.  In this view, the social and political 
processes by which regulations are formulated and enacted are opportunities for successful 
dispute resolution and education about the advantages of self-government and the need to be 
sociable—rather than an inevitable legal catastrophe in which rights are ignored and trampled.243
Insofar as the Takings Clause largely defers to the local political process but requires 
compensation or invalidates eminent domain actions when property rights are especially 
diminished or individuals are explicitly singled out, it functions both to protect and mediate.  It 
encourages, if not forces, property owners to work with their neighbors, safe with the knowledge 
that a baseline of constitutional protection will be extended when their efforts result in the 
invalid or uncompensated expropriation of their property.
Without going so far as expressly adopting an educational or mediatory rationale for its 
decision in Lingle, the Court characterized its takings jurisprudence as an effort to balance 
concern for the individual with deference to the community and democratic will.  Although 
Lingle’s “functional equivalence” doctrine identifies those regulatory instances that are “so 
onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster” and thus require 
compensation,244 the determination of when a regulation is equivalent to appropriation or ouster 
requires a court to “remain cognizant” of the government’s authority to “adjust[] . . . rights for 
the public good,” and consequently of the impossible burden government would face if it must 
pay compensation for every change in its laws.245  Thus, the categories of per se takings relieve 
239 See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society & Regulatory Takings: Castles, Investments, & Just 
Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=845904.
240 Id. at 14.
241 Id. at 16-17. 
242 Id. at 16; see also Poirier, supra note 6, at 150-83 (the “muddy rules” of property law and takings doctrine 
lead to negotiation among community members and, ultimately, stronger ties to community); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Diagnosing the Takings Problem, 33 NOMOS 248, 269-70 (1991) (contested liberal legal and political concepts and 
the need for pragmatic, situated judgments makes takings jurisprudence resistant to clear rules).
243 See Fenster, supra note 135, at 668-78; Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Political Right?, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 363-65 (1996); Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1155, 1170 (1985).
244 Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2081.
245 Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979), and citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413).
38
the “unique burden” they impose due to their equivalence with appropriation and ouster, while 
the Penn Central default test balances fairness concerns with the need to defer to government 
attempts to promote the public good.246 Kelo operates similarly, although the majority decision 
seemed less concerned about unfairness to the individual’s loss of their property and any 
potential shortfalls in compensation.  
In this sense, the Court has implicitly, although not as explicitly as Singer appears to 
claim, adopted a conception of property rights as both an individual right and as an institution 
within which those rights are balanced against the community’s needs, and of the Takings Clause 
as a means by which courts mediate this balance.  Of the rationales I have reviewed in this Part, 
this conception of the Court’s reasons for its 2005 decisions seems best able to capture at least 
parts of the decisions’ substantive purpose.  In Part III, I begin to identify the Court’s more 
explicit institutional rationales in its federalist tendencies before arguing ultimately that legal 
process and institutional settlement in fact serve as the approach underlying the Court’s 2005 
decisions.
III. The Incomplete Explanation of Federalist Deference
At stake in most, although not all, takings decisions is how the federal constitution’s Fifth 
Amendment applies to the actions of state and local governments.  A number of scholars have 
persuasively asserted that federalist concerns for state law’s supremacy over property law and 
state and local governments’ authority to oversee land use in their jurisdictions either explain or 
should play a stronger role in the Court’s takings jurisprudence.247  These arguments assert the 
following:  States, and not the federal Constitution, generally define property and the rights that 
attach to it;248 states, by statute or constitution, authorize local governmental authority to regulate 
and take property, and can thereby limit that authority;249 state constitutions include or have been 
read to include takings provisions, and state courts are perfectly capable of enforcing both those 
provisions and, if need be, federal ones;250 and state legislatures have filled any perceived gaps 
246 Id. at 2081-82.
247 See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 
MD. L. REV. 464, 490-93 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on 
Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327 (1993) [hereinafter Michelman, Property, 
Federalism, and Jurisprudence]; Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 
114 YALE L.J. 203, 270-71 (2004) [hereinafter Sterk, The Federalist Dimension]. 
248 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943); 
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 74-76 (2005); Durchslag, 
supra note 247 at 494.  One could argue, with Richard Epstein on the right and Frank Michelman on the left, that if 
states were the sole authority in the recognition of property rights, then they could simply define property narrowly 
in order to preclude a “taking,” and thereby render the Fifth Amendment’s protection meaningless.  See Richard 
Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U. CLE. L. REV. 21, 25 (1997); 
Frank I. Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 57-58 (1997). But as Stewart Sterk argues, for historical and textual reasons, there is no 
reason to think the Constitution itself confers any foundation for developing a federal property law.  See Sterk, The 
Federalist Dimension, supra note 247, at 224-25.
249 See DANIEL R. MADELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.01 (5th ed. 2003).
250 See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The Federal Courts’ 
Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 34-36 (1999); Sterk, The 
Federalist Dimension, supra note 247, at 261-62.
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and shortcomings in federal and state constitutional compensations requirements by imposing 
legislative requirements.251  In light of these structural and institutional commitments, states and 
their subordinate agencies are, or should be, granted the autonomy to regulate land use and 
ownership within their jurisdictions and without overly intrusive federal constitutional rules 
imposed upon them by the U.S. Supreme Court and enforced by the federal judiciary.252
Federalism proponents offer consequentialist claims as well as structural ones, arguing 
that deference to state law and state courts offers significant beneficial consequences. State 
courts and legislatures are better situated than the Supreme Court to devise either optimal takings 
rules that could apply in multiple states, or rules that are narrowly tailored to a state’s specific 
needs or legal culture.253  The complex nature and wide variance of state property law advises
against Supreme Court efforts to impose significant, complicated takings rules that would 
provide little guidance to state courts and legislatures and local regulators, and that would lead 
ultimately to uneven enforcement by state and lower federal courts.254  Deference to lower levels 
of government also enables state and local jurisdictions to compete for potential residents with 
differentiated package of public goods, tax rates, and regulatory regimes; individuals can then 
simulate shoppers in their decisions about where to live to find jurisdictions that offer the most 
attractive packages of public goods amenities, property values, and taxes, and can thereby reward 
or punish local governments based on their effectiveness.255  So long as some minimal legal 
checks are available to require bad-acting local governments to compensate victims of unfairly 
outlying regulation, then the market that develops through competitive localism will be more 
beneficial to property owners than rigorous federal constitutional protections.256
Federalism therefore appears to be a persuasive explanation of the Court’s takings 
jurisprudence—and, indeed, two of the 2005 decisions explicitly noted its influence in their 
outcomes.  The Kelo majority characterized early twentieth century precedent on public use as 
having “embodied a strong theme of federalism” in its respect for the decisions of state 
legislatures, and implied that this principle supported its decision.257  The Court in San Remo
251 See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 187 (1997).
252 In this sense, the “federalism” at stake in the constitutional protection of property rights is one based upon 
state autonomy from federal interference, rather than what Ernest Young has characterized as federalism-based 
“sovereignty” doctrines that bar states from being held accountable for their violations of federal norms.  See Ernest 
A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Two 
Federalisms].
253 This may be especially true of state courts, which are freer to depart from the limiting rules on judicial 
power that emanate from Article III’s justiciability doctrine. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive 
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1836-40 (2001).
254 Sterk, The Federalist Dimension, supra note 247, at 226-37.
255 See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 209, at 58- 71 (summarizing and extending the theory 
of competitive localism in Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), 
and the literature that has developed from it); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:  
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 527-28 (1991). 
256 See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 209, at 272-75, 283-85; cf. George Wyeth, Regulatory 
Competition and the Takings Clause, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 105-06 (1996) (proposing regulatory takings approach 
that would require compensation when a state fails to behave in a competitive market by taking advantage of 
property owners and failing to balance the interest of all citizens equitably).
257 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2664.  The majority also encouraged property owners to seek more stringent judicial 
review of economic development takings under state law from their state courts and legislatures.  See id. at 2668.  
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suggested that its decision not to except takings decisions from the Full Faith and Credit Act 
relied in part on its “weighty” interest in demonstrating comity towards state court judgments, as 
well as on state courts’ experience “in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal 
questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.”258
But notwithstanding occasional language to support it, federalism appears either to be a 
secondary rationale or a post hoc explanation for takings decisions.  When the Court relies upon 
federalism at all—which it did not do in Lingle’s unanimous explanation of its regulatory takings 
doctrine—it typically raises it as one among a series of rationales.259  Perhaps most significantly, 
the conservative justices who have expressed and voted more regularly for limiting the 
application of federal constitutional rights to the states, at least with respect to state immunity 
from federal statutory claims, 260 are those who have been most vocally opposed to the Court’s 
approach to the Takings Clause.261  At the same time, the justices who have opposed the Court’s 
expansion of federalism in its state sovereign immunity decisions have also cited federalist 
principles and the need to defer to state judgments and legislatures in takings cases.262  Even 
granting the sincerity of conservative justices’ commitment to a natural, pre-political right in 
property, and of liberal justices’ commitment to the sovereignty of state governments, one cannot 
help but conclude that their respective positions in takings cases represent a strategic approach to 
federalism that defers to state authority only to the extent that such deference creates a result that 
is consistent with other, competing concerns.263
See also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 (noting the significant, “suitable” role of state legislatures in engaging in 
land use regulation such as temporary planning moratoria).
258 San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2505, 2507.
259 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2661-64 (identifying “a strong theme of federalism” in the Court’s public use 
precedents only after it stated that the “public purpose” rule, the weight of precedent, the need for judicial restraint, 
and the difficulty of setting judicial standards to police a more stringent public use test required upholding the 
challenged taking under the Public Use Clause).
260 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that under the 
Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity bars suit by state employees for money damages 
against a state employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 67 (2000) (holding that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity bars private damage suits brought under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding 
that Congress, acting pursuant to its Article I powers, may not abrogate states' immunity from private damage suits).
261 See, e.g., Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority’s deferral to state 
legislatures for property rights protection a “refusal to enforce properly the Federal Constitution” and “an abdication 
of our responsibility”); San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2508-09 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (questioning whether any 
“federalism-based concerns” and “comity” require takings plaintiffs to exhaust all of the judicial remedies offered 
by the state before proceeding to federal court).  See generally Michelman, Property, Federalism, and 
Jurisprudence, supra note 247, at 311-314 (explaining that Justice Scalia’s decision in Lucas gives no deference to 
state court determinations of its own common law); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 252, at 6-7 (identifying 
justices who tend to favor limits on federal power, three of whom—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas—vote consistently in favor of expanding federal constitutional property rights protections against the police 
powers and taking authority of state and local governments).
262 See supra notes 257, 258 (citing Kelo, San Remo, and Tahoe-Sierra, three majority opinions authored by 
Justice Stevens that rested in part on federalism grounds); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 252, at 41-44 
(identifying Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg, all of whom tend to vote against expanded federal 
constitutional protections for property rights, as holding a commitment to a “weak autonomy” model of federalism 
that would protect state and local regulation against excessive federal preemption).
263 Cf. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence, supra note 247, at 303 (noting that conservative 
justices’ commitment to federalism subsides when it conflicts with their commitment to property rights).
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Second, if federalism were in fact the central rationale for takings law then one would 
anticipate different results when the federal government, rather than a state or local government, 
is the defendant, or when federal definitions of property rights are under review.  This has not 
been the case.  In United States v. Sperry,264 for example, the Supreme Court applied the same 
constitutional tests to a regulatory takings claim as when state or local governments were 
defendants,265 while in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,266 the Court applied the same 
constitutional tests to a claim seeking invalidation of a federal statute under the Public Use 
Clause as when state and local governments were defendants.267  The Court offered no hint that it 
considered either its takings jurisprudence or an underlying definition of property to be different 
when it considered a federally imposed user fee rather than one imposed by a state 
government.268  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit, which under the Tucker Act is the sole forum 
that can award just compensation exceeding ten thousand dollars against the United States,269
freely applies Supreme Court decisions that arose out of state court when it adjudicates claims 
brought against state and local governments.270
It is true that in two recent decisions on federal statutory redefinitions of property rights, 
Hodel v. Irving271 and Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,272 the Court held that the respective property 
owners were due compensation for having suffered takings imposed by the federal government.  
This relatively rare result might indicate that the Court enforces the Takings Clause more strictly 
against the federal government than the states.273  Neither decision, however, indicates that the 
fact that the Court was reviewing federal action determined its result.  Rather, in Hodel the Court 
264 493 U.S. 52 (1989)
265 See id. at 59-64 (rejecting claim that charge deducted from an award granted by the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal did not affect a taking, and in the process applying but distinguishing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419, and 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
266 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
267 See id. at 1014-15 (applying, among other cases, Midkiff and Berman to claim that a federal statute 
requiring disclosure of trade secrets to competitors with just compensation was invalid under the Public Use Clause).
268 See, e.g., Sperry, 493 U.S. at 62 n.8 (comparing user fee in Sperry to similar fee in Webb’s Famous 
Pharmacies); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 105 (comparing “procompetitive purpose” in Monsanto to similar purpose in 
Midkiff).
269 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
270 See, e.g., Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. U.S., 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying Palazzolo, 533 
U.S. at 606, to correct its earlier decisions in Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed.Cir. 
2000) and Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed.Cir. 1994), regarding the “parcel as a 
whole” rule).  Earlier decisions seemed to indicate that the Federal Circuit had begun to develop its own approach to
regulatory takings in the gaps left open by Supreme Court decisions reviewing state regulation, although at the time 
commentators noted that such idiosyncracies were more the result of ideological, anti-regulatory commitments than 
any federalist or programmatic approach the circuit had adopted. See David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence 
of the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 828-31 (1999); Douglas T. Kendall & 
Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 509, 533-38 (1998); Michael C. Blumm, Twenty Years of Environmental Law: Role Reversals Between 
Congress and the Executive, Judicial Activism Undermining the Environment, and the Proliferation of 
Environmental (and Anti-Environmental) Groups, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 10-11 (2001).  Bass Enterprises, among 
other decisions, demonstrates that the federal circuit considers the Supreme Court’s takings decisions to apply 
equally to all state actors, federal or otherwise. 
271 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
272 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
273 See Sterk, The Federalist Dimension, supra note 247, at 255-56.
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held that the challenged statute effected a taking by expropriating, without compensation, an 
essential right of property, the right to pass valuable property to one’s heirs.274  The character of 
the property right taken, and not the identity of the state actor, was the reason the plaintiff was 
owed compensation.  Similarly, the four-justice plurality in Eastern Enterprises held that the 
challenged statute’s imposition of “severe retroactive liability” on the plaintiffs substantially 
interfered with their reasonable investment-backed expectation and therefore effected a taking.275
Thus, the character of the government action and the extent of the burden on the property owner 
tipped the balance in favor of the property owner, not the identity of the state actor.  In recent 
decisions, including those from 2005, the Court has not cited Hodel and Eastern Enterprises as 
examples of more stringent federal court review of the federal government: the majority in Kelo
and Justice Kennedy in Lingle cited Eastern Enterprises as relevant precedent for considering 
actions against state agencies,276 and the Court has repeatedly cited Hodel as relevant outside of 
the context of federal government actions.277
In short, the Court invokes federalist principles regularly in its takings decisions, and, at 
least during the Rehnquist Court, a majority of justices appeared to be committed to deferring to 
state and local government authority over land use controls.  But, as Part IV argues, in the 2005 
takings decisions federalism operated as part of the Court’s broader, legal process-based 
commitment to institutional settlement and competencies.
IV. Of Institutions and Competencies: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property 
Rights
The approaches to takings law discussed in Part II seek to identify both what question 
should be asked about the extent of federal constitutional protections against takings and how it 
should be answered.  The federalist approach discussed in Part III primarily asserts that federal 
constitutional law should not dominate the regulation and taking of property, which is largely of 
state concern.  But none of these approaches frames takings law in the way the Court does in its 
2005 decisions.  Resolving a broad array of substantive and procedural issues, Kelo, Lingle, and 
San Remo provide a vision of structure and process that is consumed with the question of who
should decide which question when—not what should be decided. This Part argues that the 
Court’s focus most closely resembles that of the legal process school, and appears to borrow 
three of that approach’s core concepts relating to governing institutions and their relative 
competencies.  Recognizing the role of legal process in substantive constitutional doctrine helps 
274 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716.
275 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 528-32; see also id. at 549-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (finding that the statute’s retroactivity violated the Due Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause).  
Justice Kennedy’s separate decision provided the deciding vote in Eastern Enterprises.
276 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2670 (citing Justice Kennedy’s separate decision in Eastern Enterprises for the 
proposition that the constitution may require the invalidation of especially irrational government actions); Lingle, 
125 S.Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing his separate decision in Eastern Enterprises for the proposition 
that the substantive due process doctrine protects property owners from especially irrational government actions).
277 See, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-35 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Hodel for the proposition that 
the Court has “never held that a takings claim is defeated simply on account of the lack of a personal financial 
investment by a postenactment acquirer of property, such as a donee, heir, or devisee”); Phillips v. Washington 
Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998) (citing Hodel for the proposition that “possession, control, and 
disposition are . . . valuable rights” of property, no matter if the property has little or no value to the owner).
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us to understand the historical dynamic that resulted in the 2005 decisions, offers some 
predictive insight into the future of takings law (and especially of the Public Use Clause, if the 
Roberts Court decides to revisit the issue and overturn or limit Kelo), and enables better 
understanding of the generalized dissatisfaction scholars and the public have with the Court’s 
takings jurisprudence.
A. Legal Process: Institutional Settlement and Competency
The legal process school (or approach) to governance and adjudication came to dominate 
legal education and public law scholarship in the post-war period, and today it remains a 
pervasive, if not wholly predominant, understanding of the modern regulatory state and 
especially of the judiciary’s role within it.278 Five members of the Rehnquist Court—Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of whom remain on the Roberts Court—were 
explicitly introduced to the legal process approach as Harvard law students.279 Its great 
expression was in the unpublished casebook “materials” that bore the name The Legal Process, 
which were developed by Harvard professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, used in classes at 
Harvard, and adopted in mimeographed form for use by the authors’ colleagues and by other 
legal academics.280 The approach arose out of a confluence of influences, including Justice 
Brandeis’s opinions on the Supreme Court (such as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins281), legal 
realism, Felix Frankfurter’s administrative law and federal jurisdiction scholarship and teaching 
at Harvard, and, after Brandeis left the Court and Frankfurter joined it, decisions by Justices 
Frankfurter, Harlan, and Stone.282
Legal process proceeded from three basic claims.  First, law is purposive and 
instrumental, and ultimately a means to “solve the basic problems of social living” and to enable 
the prosperity and smooth functioning of modern society.283  Second, the “legal process” extends 
beyond formal judicial adjudication and statutes, and includes both private ordering (which Hart 
278 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 2031, 2032-33 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Making]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Gary Peller, The 
New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1991); 
Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 
OR. L. REV. 69, 124-27 (2005); Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social 
and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 475 (1995); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a 
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1149-50 (2005).
279 William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and Critical Introduction to HART & SACKS, 
supra note 11, at cxxv [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction].  See also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The 
Question of Process, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1387 (2000) (chief judge of the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals 
declaring his commitment to legal process approach).
280 On the history of the Hart and Sacks materials, see Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 278, at 2033-
42, and on its adoption by other legal academics, see Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 279, at cii-civ. 
They were finally published, more as an historical text than as a working casebook, in 1994.  HART & SACKS, supra
note 11.  As Neil Duxbury has observed, contemporary readers cannot replicate the materials’ role in producing its 
main intended effect, the “classroom experience” of legal process.  See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process 
Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 653 (1993)
281 304 U.S 64 (1938).
282 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 223-28 (2000); Eskridge & 
Frickey, Introduction, supra note , at liv-lxviii; Fenster, supra note 278, at 124- 27; Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935).
283 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 148.
44
and Sacks described as the “primary process of social adjustment”284) and the modern regulatory 
state.285   Third, the processes and structures of the legal process, which compose a “coordinated, 
functioning whole made up of a set of interrelated, interacting parts,”286 are “obviously more 
fundamental than the substantive arrangements in the structure of society . . . since they are at 
once the source of the substantive arrangements and the indispensable means of making them 
work effectively.”287  In brief, as both an academic and normative matter, “process,” defined 
quite broadly, overshadowed and perhaps even transcended substance.288
Three fundamental concepts and one significant insight from the legal process school are 
relevant to current takings jurisprudence, and I will focus here only on them.289  First, the key 
legal process concept of “institutional settlement” refers to a society’s development of “duly 
established procedures” that are employed by competent institutions to arrive at substantive 
decisions that are in turn binding and legitimate as a result of the process by which they are 
made.290  These institutional arrangements include the federal system of governance, which,
Henry Hart explained, offers “varied facilities, providing alternative means of working out . . . 
solutions of problems which cannot be solved unilaterally.”291 This includes the system of 
federal courts292 as well as state laws and institutions.293  The structured relationship among these 
various parts, as well as the interrelated and internal procedures utilized to enable this 
complicated apparatus to function, constitute the institutional settlement that the legal process 
school both privileged and obsessed over.
“Institutional competency,” a second key legal process concept, asserts that a satisfactory 
institutional settlement would both assign the kinds of disputes or issues that arise to the 
institutions best able to resolve them, and enable institutions to develop and employ the optimal 
284 Id. at 159-61.
285 Id. at 342.
286 Id. at cxxxvii.
287 Id. at 3-4.
288 Gary Peller, “Neutral Principles” in the 1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 569 (1988).
289 The primary literature produced during the heyday of the legal process approach, and the secondary 
literature commenting on and chronicling the approach, is vast.  For summaries, see Duxbury, supra note 280; 
Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 279.  I am only extracting some of the approach’s tenets, although the 
ones I discuss are among the most significant.
290 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 4.
291 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 490 (1954).
292 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).  
Federal courts as a subject of academic inquiry was, contemporaneous with the rise of legal process, overtaken by 
what has become known as the Hart & Wechsler “paradigm,” so-called because of the casebook edited by legal 
process theorists Henry Hart (who was also developing the legal process casebook materials at the same time) and 
Herbert Wechsler.  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, eds., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (Foundation, 1953); Fallon, supra.  The Hart and Wechsler approach to federal courts shared with 
the legal process school an institutionalist focus, a functionalist approach to governing structures, and a triumphant 
celebration of the specific, narrow competencies that the judiciary offer.  HART & WECHSLER, supra, at ix-x. Hart 
and Wechsler’s institutionalism was more narrowly focused on federalism and the preservation of spheres of state 
sovereign autonomy as opposed to legal process’s broader consideration of decision-making institutions, while Hart 
and Wechsler’s functionalism focused on the separation of federal powers, while, again, legal process more broadly 
considered the legal system as an array of separate yet interlocking institutions. On the relationship between the 
Hart and Wechsler approach to federal courts and the Hart and Sacks approach to legal process, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 689-91 (1989) (book review).
293 See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 168-74.
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procedures to reach the best results.294  Put another way, institutional settlement both assumes 
and produces competent institutions—and, put together, institutional settlement around 
competent institutions produces good, informed policy.295  A regulatory agency, for example, 
acquires expert skill from its technical knowledge and the experience that it develops through 
continuing administrative responsibility over a statutorily-created, regulatory scheme.  The 
agency devotes the entirety of its resources and time and for which it develops rules and 
procedures.296  A narrowly-focused, expert agency thus has greater competency in the area in 
which it operates than a court of general jurisdiction, which will have only a fleeting concern 
about the statute, the agency, and its implementing program.297
A third concept arising out of the legal process school that is relevant to the Court’s 
takings jurisprudence relates to the specific processes and competencies of the judiciary—or, as 
the preface in the Hart and Wechsler casebook on federal courts stated, “what courts are good 
for.”298  The Hart and Sacks materials presented a straightforward statement of these 
competencies in contrast to those of political institutions: courts, Hart and Sacks advised, employ 
reason, as constrained by established technique and procedure, to resolve a dispute.  By contrast, 
substantive policy disputes that can only be resolved by preference or “sheer guesswork” are 
better “left to be made by count of noses at the ballot box.”299  Courts, unlike legislatures, utilize 
“reasoned elaboration” in resolving a dispute, explicating the “general directive arrangement” 
that it applies “in a way which is consistent with the other established application of it,” and “in a 
way which best serves the principles and policies it expresses.”300  A court that interprets a 
statute, therefore, must find the purpose of the statute and the general policy or principle it is 
intended to further, and then reason towards a result consistent with the statute’s purpose;301
while a court that applies common law doctrine must similarly attempt to discern from precedent 
the doctrine’s purpose and rule, principle, or standard, and elaborate how the court’s conclusions 
about the case and controversy before it flow from the generally applicable law.302
Although the original legal process materials that Hart and Sacks developed concerned 
statutory and general common law, other process advocates more explicitly extended the 
approach’s insights to constitutional adjudication. As Hart’s student Alexander Bickel,303 among 
others, characterized it, Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of state action works as 
294 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 110-12.
295 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 154; Eskridge & Peller, supra note 278, at 721-22; Anthony Sebok, 
Reading The Legal Process 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1574 (1996) (reviewing HART & SACKS, supra note 11). 
296 Neither the Hart and Sacks material nor the legal process school as a whole focused extensively on 
administrative agencies and administrative law.  As I explain elsewhere, the legal process emerged in part out of an 
earlier academic and judicial ferment in that field.  See Fenster, supra note 278, at 123-27.
297 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 1290.
298 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 292, at x.
299 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 110-12.
300 See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 147.
301 See id.
302 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 644.
303 Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of 
Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 619 (1991).
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part of an organic web of competent institutions with set tasks and competencies.304
Constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court is limited to guaranteeing certain basic civil 
rights as a matter of positive law;305 protecting the integrity of the political process against 
systematic distortion through exclusion or oppression of minorities;306 and, above all, to the wise 
and prudent use of the Court’s jurisdiction and power in order to preserve the Court’s “mystic,” 
legitimating function and to educate the nation as to correct constitutional principles.307  When 
the Court wisely follows what Bickel famously called the “passive virtues” of avoiding 
avoidable conflict, it insulates itself from controversial political decisions and allows other, more 
directly accountable branches to assume the responsibility for resolving them.308  The judiciary’s 
specific institutional competence, then, is to articulate and passively enforce impersonal and 
enduring principles that would resolve, more through persuasion and education than through 
coercion, the problem that judicial review of the democratically elected political branches is 
distinctly counter-majoritarian.309
One final insight from legal process theory (although not unique to it310) will prove 
helpful in understanding the Court’s takings jurisprudence—the institutional decision to rely 
upon rules or standards in creating general directive arrangements.311  In order to bind itself and 
other institutions that follow its directives, a court (or any institution that issues commands) may 
place different degrees of definiteness in the form those directives take.  It may decide to issue an 
authoritative rule whose command is triggered upon the determination of facts; or it may decide 
to grant a future decision-maker broader discretion though a standard that requires not only the 
determination of facts, but also the appraisal of consequences, moral justifications, and human 
experience.312  More likely, the institution will choose some point along a continuum between 
these two poles, or it may include both rules and standards in its legal arrangements.313  The 
choice of rules and standards is itself a decision based on considerations of institutional 
competence—with what specificity, a drafter inquires, can I predict the regularity of disputes and 
the correct resolution to them, or to what extent should I delegate determinations to a future 
decision-maker?314
304 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24-27 (1962).  On Bickel and the explicit 
extension of legal process to constitutional issues in response to the rise of the Warren Court, see LAURA KALMAN, 
THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 35-42 (1996).
305 See Paul Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 545-51 (1951); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of States in the Composition and Selection of National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 578 (1954).
306 This revision of legal process to focus on political process occurred most explicitly in John Hart Ely’s 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-179 (1980) and Jesse Choper’s JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS 4-59 (1980).
307 BICKEL, supra note 304, at 26, 29-33.
308 See BICKEL, supra note 304, at 164-66, 197-98.
309 See id. at 16-28.
310 See generally Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1985) (citing a variety 
of sources to define and summarize the rule/standard distinction); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-66 (1992) (same).
311 See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 138.
312 See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 138-40.
313 Id. at 140-41.
314 Id. at 140.
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Concerned with governing institutions rather than politics, and with procedures rather 
than substance, legal process sought to preserve the status quo of post-war liberal consensus.315
Despite—and perhaps because of—its prominence, the approach has faced significant criticism 
and revision, especially over the past two decades.  Critics from both the critical left and the 
utilitarian middle and right have challenged many of the legal process advocates’ most bedrock 
concepts, including its assumptions that law could be divorced from policy, that the political 
branches and regulatory agencies could operate free from capture by powerful interest groups, 
and that the judiciary could formulate and follow an objective, external standard based solely 
upon reason and prudence.316  Legal process’s vision of institutions in particular no longer 
reflects the complicated operations of the contemporary federal, state, and local administrative 
agency as an institution implementing public law programs in an advanced capitalist state, nor 
does it compare well with more sophisticated theoretical approaches to understanding agency 
structures and operations.317  In other words, critics have argued, legal process assumed too 
much of institutions and procedures, and knew or predicted too little about the advancement of—
and frustrations with—the modern, postwar state.  
Liberal and conservative proponents of civil liberties and rights have also asserted that 
legal process was blind to enumerated constitutional rights, including the Takings Clause, and as 
such embraced structure and process over rights.318  This criticism, too, focuses on the avoidance 
of substantive issues in legal process—although it appears to view law as an instrumental means 
to reach a primary goal of substantive ends, legal process remained fixed on process with such 
obsession that the correct legal process emerged as an end in itself.319  As Morton Horwitz 
declared, legal process abandoned the doctrinal formalism of the pre-legal realist era in favor of 
an “institutional formalism” that fetishized abstract principles of governance rather than abstract 
legal rules.320  No less than doctrinal formalism, which constituted a dominant underlying 
jurisprudential and ideological structure shaping the doctrinal development of late 19th and early 
20th century constitutional law,321 so legal process remains, fifty years after its emergence, a key 
logic in the Court’s takings law.
B. The Legal Process of Takings Law
315 See Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 279, at cxi; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American 
Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1183-85 (1985). See generally Duxbury, supra note , at 642-53 (contextualizing legal 
process within broader academic conceptions of postwar consensus and the primacy of democratic procedures).
316 A useful summary, with citation to the numerous critiques lodged by critical legal studies and law and 
economics critics, appears in Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 279, at cxviii-cxxv; and Edward L. 
Rubin, The New Legal Process: The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1393, 1398 -1402 (1996).
317 See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 278, at 710; Rubin, supra note 316, at 1424-33.
318 See EPSTEIN, supra note , at 214; Lawrence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065, 1067 (1980).
319 See Tribe, supra note 318, at 1071.
320 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 254 (1992); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 75-77 (1995) (associating legal process 
school with classical legal formalism); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 895 (1987) 
(noting analogous approach of early twentieth century formalism with Wechsler’s use of legal process theory to 
critique the Warren Court).
321 See  Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); HORWITZ, supra note 320, at 9-
31; but see EDWARD G. WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 167-70 (2000) (complicating the 
“Formalist/ Realist debate” of the early 20th century).
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Rather than ushering in a rollback of the regulatory state,322 the federal constitutional 
Takings Clause has now become suffused with legal process conceptions of passive judicial 
review and deference to the decisions of other branches of government.  Each of the 2005 
decisions described or assumed the existence of a complicated set of institutions involved in the 
land use regulatory process, each with its own significant role to play in reaching and 
implementing important decisions, as well as in checking the authority of other institutions.  And 
each decision presented judicial review as a process of faithfully following precedent, fully 
elaborating and explaining doctrine, and, ultimately, deferring to elected officials except in 
narrowly defined instances when the government has clearly violated a well-articulated rule.  
The Court conjured up the specter of property rights in its ritualistic invocation of fairness 
principles and its concept of “functional equivalence,” but ultimately presented a judicial posture 
and set of doctrines that place the Takings Clause squarely within the well-worn confines of 
legal process.
1. The Institutions of Land Use Regulation and Takings Litigation
The 2005 decisions display a great faith in settled allocations of decision-making, in the 
relative competencies of the institutions in charge of land use controls, and in the institutional 
system through which property owners challenge those controls.  The majority in Kelo, for 
example, described a local government that had relied upon a state statute for authority to engage 
in comprehensive planning.  The city “carefully formulated” and deliberated over an economic 
development plan, and devised a redevelopment that sought to coordinate multiple uses of an 
area that incidentally included petitioners’ homes.323  Unhappy citizens and property owners 
could seek changes to these processes through the state legislatures and state constitution,324 as 
well as in city elections.  The institutions were well-settled and the procedures they used 
appeared careful and trustworthy.  Accordingly, they were constitutionally valid.
In San Remo, in addition to acknowledging Congress’s role in limiting its authority to re-
consider state court decisions that settle federal constitutional claims,325 the majority described a 
functional federal system in which state and federal courts share responsibility for judicial 
review of constitutional claims, and in which the system’s individual parts operate in a 
complimentary, efficient way to resolve disputes.  It is a systemic strength rather than a 
constitutional flaw that a plaintiff who follows the dictates of Williamson County files her initial 
state claims in state court may never have a federal court consider her federal constitutional 
claims.326  The Court’s assumption that “the weighty interests in finality and comity” outweigh 
whatever advantages that takings’ plaintiffs might gain from the chance to argue their claims 
before an additional court itself assumed that the institutional structure the court affirmed  offered 
significant advantages.327  First, the system’s parts are interchangeable—it should make no 
322 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
323 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2665.
324 Id. at 2668.
325 See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2500-01, 2505-06 (upholding the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to reconsider 
petitioners’ constitutional claims on the grounds that Congress has not excepted takings claims from the Full Faith & 
Credit Statute’s command to respect the decisions of state courts).  Cf. id. at 2507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the 
judgment) (agreeing that the Full Faith and Credit Statute precludes relitigation, but questioning the Williamson 
County rule that requires claims to be filed in state court first).
326 See supra notes 69-74 (discussing Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
327 San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2505.
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difference, for the purpose of constitutional adjudication, that a plaintiff begins in state or federal 
court.  Second, the administrative and judicial exhaustion requirement enables the best decision-
maker, a state court, to conduct the initial adjudication of a matter that is based on state 
substantive and administrative law.  Third, the importance of preserving the system’s 
functionality and efficiency supersedes any efforts to protect an individual property owner from 
state court adjudication that might allow her to bypass the system’s settled process.  And fourth, 
the system offers sufficient safeguards by allowing lower federal courts to consider federal 
constitutional issues when the state constitution’s analogous provisions are not equivalent to the 
federal constitution, and by assuring property owners that they can appeal adverse state court 
judgments under federal constitutional law to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Lingle, too, invoked the institutional settlement of land use controls.  Recall that the 
Agins “substantial advancement” test made three fundamental errors: it mistook a substantive 
due process test for a takings test; it reviewed the wrong end of a regulatory transaction by 
considering the government’s purpose and actions rather than the regulation’s effects on a 
property owner; and it invited a court to substitute its judgment for that of the government.328
The latter two errors—which follow from the first, doctrinal one—assumed that certain questions 
regarding regulatory purpose and mechanics are for the judiciary to decide.  This is exactly 
backwards—under the Takings Clause, the judiciary only considers the regulatory effects on the 
property owner.329
Obviously, deference is not a new concept to takings law.  Courts have long recognized 
that every extension of a constitutional right for compensation against a government’s use of its 
police powers, and every extension of the public use requirement on eminent domain, is also a 
limitation on long-settled and significant institutional authority that intrudes on legislative 
prerogative over social policy,330 and that may cripple the government’s regulatory authority and 
willingness to exercise it.331  But considered together as a comprehensive overview of the 
Court’s approach to substantive and procedural takings doctrines, the 2005 decisions signal that 
the Court’s primary focus is on administrative and judicial process rather than on the extent of 
substantive property rights protections.
2. The Limits of Judicial Competency and Judicial Review
The 2005 decisions exemplify a modest approach to judicial review in two ways: they 
faithfully followed and elaborated upon precedent, and they upheld mostly open-ended standards 
328 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52 (summarizing Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2083-85).
329 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (summarizing Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2081-82).
330 See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30 (regulations that are “reasonably related to the 
implementation of a policy . . . [that is] expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all 
similarly situated property” does not effect a taking); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954) (“Subject to specific 
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh 
conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by 
social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia ... or the States legislating 
concerning local affairs.”); United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551 (1946) (“[I]t is the function of 
Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use.”); Miller v. Schoene, 276, U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (refusing 
to find violation of Takings Clause where the government is forced to make a choice that is unavoidable and its 
considerations of social policy “are not unreasonable”).
331 See, e.g. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (government “could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”)
50
that require lower courts to defer to the regulatory and eminent domain decisions of local 
governments.  In terms of precedent, both the San Remo majority and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
San Remo concurrence explained that they were bound by Williamson County’s exhaustion 
requirement to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision, although the four-justice concurrence 
indicated an interest in reconsidering the litigation exhaustion requirement.332 Lingle restated 
and stitched all of the significant regulatory takings decisions of the Rehnquist and Burger 
Courts together into a coherent whole—although it did so to overrule a stray part of one 
longstanding decision.333
To understand Kelo’s fidelity to Berman and Midkiff, recall that Justice Thomas’s dissent 
conceded that ruling against the government defendant would require overruling a century of 
precedent interpreting the Public Use Clause.334  Justice O’Connor’s dissent attempted to find a 
middle ground that would keep Berman and Midkiff’s deferential posture but excise the “errant 
language” in those decisions that confused eminent domain authority with the police power.335
But even if the language to which Justice O’Connor objected were removed, the core of the 
Court’s settled deference to legislative determinations under the Public Use Clause would still 
stand—and, significantly, the Kelo  majority did not rely upon or even cite either the “errant 
language” or the police power.  As the majority noted, Justice O’Connor’s proposed reading of 
public use precedent departed considerably both from the factual predicate of those decisions, 
which did not require harmful uses in order to authorize the taking, and from those decisions’ 
examination only of the legislature’s purpose in the taking rather than the land’s future uses.336
All three decisions also provided fulsome explanations of the principles upon which they 
relied—Kelo, in affirming the need to defer to well-formulated, authorized decisions of local 
governments,337 San Remo, in affirming the need to respect state court judgments and authority 
to decide federal constitutional claims,338 and Lingle, in explicating the regulatory takings 
doctrine.339 Lingle is especially telling in this regard.  Recall that Lingle performed two 
significant moves:  it found an unbroken narrative in the messy development of regulatory 
takings doctrine, and it discerned a basic principle that explained a complicated set of default 
standards and exceptional rules.340  Due both to its unanimity and its effort to restate and justify 
the universe of takings tests, Lingle is the most authoritative regulatory takings decision since 
Penn Central, notwithstanding the fact that the question presented to the Court merely required it 
to explain and justify a stray doctrine that had never been enforced by the Supreme Court.
Doing so, Lingle also exemplified the 2005 decisions’ effort to match the proper legal 
form to the degree of deference that the lower courts should give the decisions of political and 
administrative agencies.  Lingle explained that outside of the “two relatively narrow categories” 
332 See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2504, 2506; id. at 2507-09 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
333 See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
334 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2678, 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
335 Id. at 2674-75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 204, and Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-
33).
336 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2666 n.16; see also id. at 2663-64 (summarizing Midkiff and Berman).
337 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2664-67.
338 San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2504-07.
339 See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2080-82.
340 See text supra accompanying notes 53-68.
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of “per se” takings and the “special application” of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for 
certain types of development conditions, courts should apply the multi-factor Penn Central
standard.341  To the former, narrowly-defined set of regulations, courts must apply the heightened 
scrutiny of strong rules; to the latter, much larger category courts must apply the more deferential 
standard. Kelo similarly directed lower courts through legal form, refusing to adopt any “rigid 
formulas and intensive scrutiny” and choosing instead to defer to the legislative determination of 
public use.342 The Court rejected both a strict “use by the public” rule, which would limit the 
legislature’s authority to respond to the “always evolving needs of society,”343 and Justice 
O’Connor’s suggestion of a middle ground between a narrow, bright-line rule and a deferential 
standard,344 arguing that any test other than a deferential one would lead courts to review the 
wisdom of the legislature’s determination and would ultimately cause legislative and regulatory 
uncertainty and delays in the planning and redevelopment process.345  The Court thus offered a 
legal standard so open-ended and deferential that it left open the question of when, short of clear 
evidence of corruption, a taking for economic development purposes is sufficiently suspect to 
warrant invalidation.346
For the 2005 decisions, judicial competency extended to the question of decisional 
allocation and to the legal form of those decisions—with the assumption that the form will likely 
be some type of deferential standard—but not to the substantive matter of property rights.  And 
thus the legal process of takings includes not only judicial competency but also the presumed 
competency of political and regulatory institutions as well as the system within which all of the 
relevant institutions have their place.  The Court has shifted its focus from the protection of an 
individual’s constitutional property rights from interference by the regulatory state to the 
decisional authority and processes of the regulatory state itself.
Conclusion: The Satisfactions and Frustrations of Takings Process
When courts adhere to the legal process approach, they resolve disputes conservatively—
that is, in a jurisprudential, rather than political, sense.  Legal process constrains judicial efforts 
to overturn precedent, especially when the motives reflect ideological reasons—although in 
doing so, of course, the legal process approach has the ideological effect of protecting the status 
quo and stabilizing constitutional common law.347  In addition, legal process pushes courts to
accept and affirm an existing system of governance and existing distributions of entitlements, 
rather than risk judicial legitimacy by imposing counter-majoritarian judgments against the will 
341 See Lingle, 125 S.Ct. at 2081-82, 2086-87.
342 Id. at 2663-64.
343 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2662; see also id. at n.8 (noting that state courts had frequently circumvented or 
abandoned the “use by the public test” during times of significant economic development).
344 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2674-75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that economic development takings 
violate Public Use Clause, but allowing that takings resulting in privately owned property would be valid if the 
former use “inflicted affirmative harm on society”).
345 Id. at 2667-68.
346 Id. at 2667.
347 Cf. Frank B. Cross, Legal Process, Legal Realism and the Strategic Political Effects of Procedural Rules
(U. Tex. Law Sch. Pub, Law Research Paper No. 81, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=837665 (empirical 
study of the precedential value of procedural doctrines demonstrating that although procedure appears non-
ideological in character, it has ideological effects). 
52
of politically accountable institutions.348  And legal process counsels courts to avoid substantive 
legal issues that concern significant social and political problems, and focus their attention 
instead on procedural and institutional issues.349  Legal process, in short, is a theory of judicial 
restraint that, when adopted, constrains courts that might otherwise depart from existing legal 
and political arrangements.
This Article has proposed that the predominance of a legal process approach to takings 
explains the very different approach taken in the Court’s 2005 decisions, when government 
defendants won in Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo, from that taken in the 1986 Term, when 
government defendants lost in three of the four decisions.350  Two decades ago, the Court flirted 
with an active jurisprudence that found the existence of institutional failure that resulted in 
constitutionally suspect regulation; now, I have argued, the Court has fallen back to the “passive 
virtue” of deference to political institutions and a focus on process, and as a result has found 
constitutionally sufficient procedures that resulted in losing plaintiffs neither receiving 
compensation nor enjoining government actions.  
The advantage of the latter, present approach is that it avoids conflicts with other 
branches of government—and especially, in the case of the application of the Takings Clause to 
land use controls, with the several states and their subsidiary agencies.  And as with the 
somewhat ironic result that it is the liberal, pro-regulatory justices that embrace federalist 
rhetoric in takings decisions, so it is that the same justices also embrace a deferential, restrained 
approach to judicial review in the takings context when they may be less willing to do so in other 
substantive areas of law.351  Richard Lazarus has complained that conservative Supreme Court 
justices, whether because of their apathy or antipathy towards environmental law, treat 
environmental statutes as merely another branch of administrative law and defer to the political 
branches whenever statutory language allows the Court to do so.352  In takings law, it is liberal 
justices who treat the open-ended language of the Fifth Amendment as a type of administrative 
law that requires deference to political branches utilizing their police and eminent domain 
powers.  But leaving aside whatever instrumentally ideological objectives the justices may 
harbor, legal process teaches that it is inherently satisfactory and downright virtuous to resolve a 
difficult question by deferring to the decision another branch of government, which is itself part 
of a well-considered complex of administrative institutions and procedures.
But it can also be a frustrating way to resolve constitutional disputes,, especially when the 
public that wants a better, more understandable explanation.  Judicial passivity and institutional 
settlement may seem the logical choice to many judges and jurisprudes, but they sound unduly 
technocratic and mistaken, if not outrageous, in the context of an “ownership society” and a 
348 Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1683, 1712 (1998).
349 See Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 571-72 (1995).
350 See supra note 3. 
351 See generally Peller, supra note 288 (characterizing the mainstream liberalism of legal process theory as a 
bulwark against social and legal change).
352 See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 737-41 (2000).
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culture committed to the single family home.353 If nothing else, the response to Kelo
demonstrates the disjuncture between the quasi-scientific observations of legal process and the 
populist sentiments of the public and the anti-Kelo coalition.354  Taking their cue from the 
majority decision,355 political officials and property rights advocates have responded with a 
plethora of constitutional and legislative proposals at the federal and state level to limit economic 
development takings.356  Although their actions are consistent with the tenets of legal process 
that would encourage political actors rather than judges to make significant, controversial 
political decisions, the fact that judicial passivity is deemed actively offensive by a broad 
segment of the public is more than a little ironic.
 Legal process is also a frustrating approach for academics who would prefer a more 
candid, rigorous effort to defend or penalize government efforts to control land use.  How does 
the Court know that the institutions it presumes are competent, which use procedures it also 
presumes are competent, in fact produce decisions that benefit the public and do not place an 
excessive burden on individual property owners?  The answer in Kelo is unclear, because the 
Court refused to enunciate a test;357 the answer in Lingle is based on over- and under-inclusive 
proxy tests for onerous regulatory burdens;358 and the answer in San Remo is that a frustrated 
plaintiff who loses in state court may still file a petition for certiorari and hope for Supreme 
Court review.359  Although legal process concepts such as institutional settlement and 
competency certainly have both normative and rhetorical appeal as principles that suggest 
offering judicial deference to other governmental bodies, they suffer as concepts of governance 
is their presumptive nature, as the Court’s largely procedural answers to substantive questions 
demonstrate.  
The legal process of the 2005 decisions rests on heroic assumptions about an agency’s 
structural, rather than actual, competence.360  It makes minimal effort to perform the difficult 
empirical task of comparative institutional analysis to identify which institutions more 
effectively perform certain tasks—the answer for which may not rest at all on the institution’s 
structural position or procedures.361  Accordingly, the 2005 decisions appear like thin gruel to 
353 For definitions and a critique of the “ownership society,” see Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by 
Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary 
American “Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005); for details on homeownership rates, and especially 
on the unrepresentative nature of ownership patterns, see Lee Ann Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 626-29 
(2002) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS]).
354 For a summary of the public response, see Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo is Not Good News for Local Planners 
and Developers, __ Georgia State University Law Review ___ (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=880149.
355 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct at 2668.
356 See Memorandum from Larry Morandi, Group Dir., Env't, Energy & Transp., Nat'l Conference of State 
Legislatures to State Legislators Interested in Eminent Domain Issues (Nov. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/EmindomainMemo.htm.
357 See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2667 (refusing to articulate a test for whether an economic development taking is for 
private purposes as opposed to public purposes.
358 See supra text accompanying notes 166-170.
359 See San Remo. 125 S.Ct. at 2506.
360 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886-88 
(2003).
361 See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS 3-13, 271 (1994).
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government advocates as well, given the Court’s unwillingness to actively affirm the state action 
under review.362  In this regard, Kelo pales considerably in comparison to Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co.,363 which almost eighty years earlier had upheld against constitutional 
challenge an early zoning ordinance in part because of the Court’s confidence in the 
comprehensiveness, “painstaking consideration,” and overall wisdom of the expert commissions 
that engaged in land use planning.364  In Kelo, the majority appeared less confident of the 
wisdom of the city’s actions, considering it sufficient that New London’s procedures met a 
process-oriented constitutional baseline.
Merely rejecting or ignoring legal process insights may be no less frustrating, however.  
Imagine if the doubts expressed in the San Remo concurrence about the wisdom of requiring 
plaintiffs to exhaust state court remedies, as well as state administrative remedies, bore fruit and 
that aspect of Williamson County was overturned.365  Would the lower federal courts do a fairer, 
more effective job of resolving land use disputes?  A number of federal judges emphatically 
think not.366
More dramatically, imagine if the Roberts Court decided to overturn or limit the majority 
decision in Kelo and impose a stricter, rule-like limit under the Public Use Clause on eminent 
domain actions that result in the taken property ending up in private hands.  The Court’s 
institutional settlement of its regulatory takings doctrine in Lingle demonstrates the hurdles 
facing that effort.  After more than a generation of experimentation with heightened judicial 
scrutiny of regulatory actions under the Takings Clause, the Court has decided, ultimately, to 
“eat crow” and scale back its regulatory takings jurisprudence.367  Any effort to re-invigorate 
constitutional property rights protections under the Takings Clause faces a difficult choice.  It 
could abandon the Rehnquist Court’s ultimate commitment to legal process theory, and consider 
some other jurisprudential approach to constitutional challenges under the Takings Clause; or, if 
362 See Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme Court: Kelo v. City of 
New London, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 42 (2005), available at http://www.vjel.org/takings/mihaly_article.pdf. This 
was made even clearer when, after Kelo was issued Justice Stevens announced in a public speech that he disagreed 
with New London’s redevelopment project as a matter of policy, but felt duty-bound to uphold it in his position as a 
justice.  See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A-1.
363 Id. at 2665 n.12 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
364 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95.
365 See San Remo, 125 S.Ct. at 2509-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
366 See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“Federal courts are not boards of zoning appeals. This message, oft-repeated, has not penetrated the consciousness 
of property owners who believe that federal judges are more hospitable to their claims than are state judges. Why 
they should believe this we haven't a clue; none has ever prevailed in this circuit. . . .”); Coniston Corp. v. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (in affirming a district court’s dismissal of a 
substantive due process claim, exclaiming that if the panel were to hold otherwise, “we cannot imagine what zoning 
dispute could not be shoehorned into federal court in this way, there to displace or postpone consideration of some 
worthier object of federal judicial solicitude. Something more is necessary than dissatisfaction with the rejection of a 
site plan to turn a zoning case into a federal case.”).  Judges affiliated with the University of Chicago Law School do 
not hold a monopoly on such sentiment—or on its sarcastic articulation.  See, e.g., Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 
870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The Supreme Court has erected imposing barriers . . . to guard against the 
federal courts becoming the Grand Mufti of local zoning boards.”).  And this judicial preference dates back more 
than a century.  See Kansas ex rel. Tufts v. Ziebold, (D. Kan.), affirmed, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) 
(reprinted in Mugler, 8 S.Ct. 273, 277).
367 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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it decides to remain within the comforting confines of legal process, it will face the same 
doctrinal and adjudicatory challenge of defining the extent of substantive constitutional property 
rights and the limits of governmental actions that produced the wondrous complexity of the
regulatory takings doctrine.  We could end up a decade hence with a muddled Public Use Clause 
doctrine, and all of the attendant judicial confusion and law review commentary.  In other words, 
the Roberts Court would be required to walk a difficult tightrope between the passively virtuous 
respect for political institutions that legal process prescribes and the substantive intervention into 
the work those institutions perform that more fulsome property rights protection would demand.  
The 2005 decisions have placed this dilemma in the foreground.  They may have put to 
rest the major issues arising out of Takings Clause, but they do not do so satisfactorily.  The fact 
that they do so at all, however, is an accomplishment attributable in no small part to the 
continuing salience of legal process.
